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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Corporate Political Activity (CPA), defined as “policies, processes and practices that are
intended to influence governmental policy or process,” (den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, &
Lankveld, 2014: 796) is an area that has generated some considerable interest in the management
literature (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Citizens
United v. FEC has made the study of this field all the more important (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010;
Hansen, Rocca, & Ortiz, 2015; Stratmann & Verret, 2015). That decision allowed managers to
spend unlimited sums of corporate funds on political activities (Stratmann & Verret, 2015).
Restrictions in American law severely limit the ability of shareholders to control these activities
by managers, leading to the potential for abuse (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010). That said, CPA can
also provide an impressive return on investment for some firms (Bonardi, Holburn, & Bergh, 2006;
Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Schuler, 1996; Shaffer, 1995). The question for shareholders and
scholars, then, is how to achieve these returns.
Thus far, researchers have been largely unable to answer that question. Efforts to show a
relationship between CPA and performance have been largely unsuccessful (Hadani & Schuler,
2013). Furthermore, scholars have proposed a theory to explain CPA, treating it as a market in
which demanders of policy, which include businesses, exchange value for policy consideration
from suppliers, such as elected officials and regulators (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005). This
approach suffers from a number of theoretical problems, including the high potential for market
failure due to the inability to enforce agreements, and its empirical support has been mixed
(Bonardi et al., 2006). Similarly, in the political science literature, scholars have adopted a theory
that looks at how interest groups can exert influence on political players that seems out of
proportion to the groups’ size (Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2005; Hart, 2004). This theory too has
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suffered from a lack of empirical support (Hansen et al., 2005). The upshot of this research has
been an inability for scholars of either discipline to determine why firms engage in CPA (Hadani
& Schuler, 2013; Hansen et al., 2005).
In response to this muddle, I propose a new theory called “The Political Landscape.” In
essence, I propose certain constraints that govern the relationships between politicians and
businesses. As with legitimacy from institutional theory (Suchman, 1995), these constraints limit
the potential actions of parties, while also being subject to modification by these actors. I point to
three such constraints: the politicians’ ideology, their relationships with supporters, and the
political trends of their constituencies. Following resource dependency theory (Casciaro &
Piskorski, 2005), I envision a struggle in which both sides seek to enhance their power relative to
the other party by both responding to and impacting these constraints (see also Suchman, 1995;
Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). This theory forms the basis of the first part of my proposed
dissertation.
The next section of my dissertation involves an empirical test in which I find strong support
for many of the arguments I advance, with one major exception. Where I predicted that businesses
seeking to build support among policymakers for their favored positions would do so by appealing
primarily to undecided politicians, it appears instead that most CPA efforts are instead aimed at
the two extreme positions. In effect, businesses appear to be rewarding their supporters and
punishing their enemies rather than seeking to add to their supporters from the ranks of the
undecided. This result appears consistent with the partisanship that has come to characterize
politics over the past few decades.
The final empirical research delves into this insight more deeply. I argue that agency theory
might help explain this unexpected result. Relying upon stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman,
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& Donaldson, 1997), I suggest that there exist two kinds of business practitioners who engage in
CPA. On the one hand are those who seek to influence policy with the aim of helping their business
and ultimately improving shareholder return. On the other hand are the top managers who view
their access to the shareholders’ resources as an opportunity to use these assets to pursue a personal
political agenda. My empirical tests support this theory, and find that the best performing firms
tend to build support among the undecided politicians, thus engaging in a stewardship approach
rather than an opportunistic one, as agency theory suggests (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989).
This work contributes to CPA research in at least three ways. First, it proposes a new theory
and typology that help explain activities that heretofore puzzled scholars (Hillman et al., 2004).
For example, the idea that there could be such a thing as “regulatory capture” in which firms
essentially come to dominate their government regulators (Admati & Hellwig, 2013; Hart, 2004)
was not well understood under prior theory (Holburn & Bergh, 2008). Second, it helps explain a
conundrum limiting CPA research up until now, namely scholars’ inability to find a link between
CPA and performance (Hadani, Dahan, & Doh, 2015; Hadani & Schuler, 2013). By taking into
consideration the interaction between CPA involvement and agency, I demonstrate the differing
motivations that might lead executives to CPA activity. Third, in a contribution to agency theory,
I show that the problem of opportunism is not limited to financial issues. Instead, executives may
engage in their own political agenda even if it runs counter to the interests of shareholders
(Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010; Hadani, 2012).
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Introduction
Nonmarket strategies are an important area of research within the management sciences
(Baron, 1995; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000). Defined as “coordinated actions that firms undertake in
public policy arenas” (Bonardi et al., 2006: 1209), the field of non-market strategies has as an
important component corporate political activity (CPA) (den Hond et al., 2014). Despite the fact
that it is often hard to measure non-market performance (Stevens, Kevin Steensma, Harrison, &
Cochran, 2005), the impact of CPA, defined as a firm's “policies, processes and practices that are
intended to influence governmental policy or process” (den Hond et al., 2014: 796), is broadly
acknowledged. For example, Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman (2006) found that CPA strategies can
lead to first mover advantages in developing countries. Hadani and Schuler (2013) found that CPA
efforts can measurably increase financial performance for firms engaged in highly regulated
industries. Similarly, scholars have detailed how CPA efforts can help in resolving trade disputes
(Lindeque & McGuire, 2010; Schuler, 1996). As a result, there have been calls for increased
empirical study in the field (Bonardi et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 2004; Pearce, Castro, & Guillén,
2008; Shaffer, 1995).
In an effort to explain the mechanics of CPA, a number of scholars have developed a
market-based theory of the public policy process (Bonardi et al., 2006; Schuler, Rehbein, &
Cramer, 2002). According to this approach, the political process is made up of demanders and
suppliers of public policy. The demanders are the businesses involved in CPA, as well as other
interest groups, such as labor unions or environmental advocacies. The suppliers are the politicians
who hold public office. The theory suggests that in exchange for consideration of their policy
position, demanders offer suppliers three forms of currency: information, support, and money.

5
Thus scholars use a market-based approach to help understand CPA, despite its nature as a nonmarket activity.
Unfortunately, this theoretical framework will lead to some debatable conclusions. For
example, at least two of the three currencies are of questionable value as media of exchange. Given
the ready availability of information to officials, information in and of itself has limited value to
politicians. Furthermore, while it is true that elected officials must spend much of their time raising
money for their election campaigns, a theory that views money as a currency of exchange
oversimplifies the relationship. In most cases, the financial contributions will go either to
candidates who agree with the position of the public policy demander or to those viewed as
persuadable. As a result, business interests and others will not generally contribute to candidates
who vehemently disagree with them. Therefore, it is not the contribution, in and of itself, that
causes the politician to take a policy position. Instead, there must be certain preexisting
characteristics of the politician that make him or her appealing to the business.
The above analysis reveals two problems with the market approach. First, CPA does not
occur within a market environment. In fact, in the United States and most other developed
democracies, efforts to explicitly bargain an exchange of anything for a public policy position are
illegal (Gaioni, 2012). Therefore, at best, this is a market riddled with inefficiency and subject to
opportunism (Bonardi, 2011). Second, elected officials are not blank slates. Because of the fact
that they almost certainly have been involved in politics prior to their election to office, they
already have taken certain policy positions. Similarly, since they are continually concerned about
re-election, they will be keenly interested in the views of the voters in their district. An elected
official out of step with his or her constituency will not stay in office long. Finally, elected officials
must build up relationships over long periods of time. These relationships will be with the
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supporters who, over time, have been the ones to provide funding and grassroots support to the
candidate. It is these prior policy positions, existing relationships, and voter concerns that will
primarily govern the actions of an elected official. While it is true that underlying these
relationships may be an understanding that implies some form of exchange, a more refined
understanding of CPA is needed in which such understandings are placed within the context in
which CPA takes place. Indeed, Bonardi (2011) argued that future theoretical work on CPA should
be based upon a strong understanding of how political environments work. That is what I aim to
do with this research.
In this study, I propose an extension of the political market theory that takes these complex
factors into consideration. Certainly, money, information and constituent organizing do play a role
in the political process, and they can have an important impact on the policy process. Nevertheless,
I argue that these factors do not fully address the realities of modern politics and policy advocacy.
Instead, I suggest that successful actors in the political process will be aware of the three factors
that constitute what I call the politicians’ political landscape on a given issue of interest – the
politicians’ ideology, relationships and political trends in their constituencies -- and use that
information as the basis for advocating their interests.
This model more fully explains the various dynamics that occur within the political arena.
In so doing, I contribute to the literature in three ways. First, I develop a typology of approaches
that businesses and other policy demanders can manipulate in their CPA. Second, I develop a
decision-tree detailing the process businesses must go through to determine their options in
addressing government action. Finally, in looking to the concept of legitimacy to assist me in my
analysis, I demonstrate how institutional theory might become a basis for understanding other nonmarket strategies.

7
2.2. The Current Approach to CPA
Hillman and Hitt (1999) and Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim (2005) are conceptual studies
that have become the basis for much of the subsequent work in the field. The Hillman and Hitt
(1999) article is particularly important because it creates a taxonomy for CPA as well as proposing
a decision tree to guide firms with the process of becoming politically active. From subsequent
articles, it appears that the greatest impact comes from their taxonomy (see e.g. Hillman et al.,
2004; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). In essence, they proposed three strategies: an information
strategy, a financial incentive strategy, and a constituency-building strategy. Each strategy then is
divided into a series of tactics. An information strategy includes lobbying and testifying as an
expert witness, for example. A financial incentive strategy includes contributions to politicians or
the party. Lastly, a constituency-building strategy includes grassroots mobilization of employees
and other stakeholders, advocacy advertising, and public relations. To make this taxonomy work,
the authors rely upon earlier work that describes the political process as a marketplace that includes
suppliers and demanders (Shaffer, 1995). The suppliers are the elected officials and appointed or
elected regulators; the demanders are the businesses and other interest groups. The currency of this
marketplace includes information, money, and support. The demanders supply the providers with
one of the three currencies effectively in exchange for influence on a public policy issue. This
market, however, is riddled with inefficiencies, and given the fact that there can be no explicit
bargain or enforceable contract, opportunism is a major problem (Bonardi et al., 2006). This is
where the Bonardi et al. (2005) paper comes in.
Bonardi et al. (2005) apply Porter’s Five Forces analysis to political markets to explain
why firms engage in CPA. They point out that firms more dependent on government regulation or
contracts, large firms, and those operating in more highly concentrated industries are the most
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likely to invest in such activity. They posit, however, that firms need to look at a political market
to determine whether that specific market is more or less competitive and thus more or less
attractive, just as Porter did for sustained competitive advantage. In contrast to Porter’s forces,
however, the proposed CPA forces are the level of competitiveness among the demanders of public
policy, the level of competitiveness among the suppliers, the nature of the cost-benefit analysis of
the issue, whether the firm is defending the status quo or proposing change, and the level of
partisanship over the issue. The demand side includes the various interest groups competing for
their policy preferences such as the corporate actors. On the supply side are those in government
who make the policy decisions, and they seek the currency of exchange from the demanders:
information, votes, and financial support. Most voters are rationally ignorant, since they have
neither the time nor the inclination to develop a position on most issues. As a result, most issues
are non-election issues, and are not salient to large groups of voters. Since large groups of voters
tend to be ignorant about the issue, the business will have few if any opponents for the supplier’s
support. Thus, a political issue that is not an election issue and has low salience with most voters
will be an element of an attractive political market. Similarly, if there is high rivalry among
suppliers of public policy, these elected officials will be keener to obtain the support of the firm.
Thus, a market with high rivalry among suppliers is actually a more attractive market for CPA. In
this way, the firm can look at the impact of the five forces on the specific political market and
decide whether the firm should enter that market, wait for it to become more attractive, or avoid it
entirely (Bonardi et al., 2005). The driving force behind that decision will be where the firm can
most efficiently impact the process.
The influence of this market approach to CPA has been significant, and even research in
political science and economics has essentially adopted it. For example, Lubell, Feiock, and de la
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Cruz (2009) adopted the market approach to explain how local governments make decisions on
zoning issues. In that article, the demanders of public policy are the developers seeking approvals
for their projects. Interestingly, that article takes institutions into consideration, but the institutions
considered are the actual structure of the local government (Lubell et al., 2009). Similarly, one of
the defining theories in the field suggests that businesses and other interest groups take a
transactional view of government relations, engaging in CPA when they can see sufficient benefit
from the public goods they receive in return (Hansen et al., 2005; Hart, 2004; Hojnacki, Kimball,
Baumgartner, Berry, & Leech, 2012). Unfortunately, this theory has received poor empirical
support (Hansen et al., 2005), leading some to call for an expanded theory (Hojnacki et al., 2012).
Thus, this research has application in the political science field as well.
Scholars have struggled with developing an overarching theory of CPA that resolves these
and other concerns (Getz, 2001). For example, Bonardi (2011) pointed out that the resource-based
view might not be helpful in analyzing CPA due to the fact that most resources available to
businesses so engaged are neither inimitable nor non-substitutable. Similarly, Kingsley et al.,
(2012) suggested that the driving force behind CPA is efficiency. Firms and government actors
are parties to a transaction – albeit an imperfect one – attempting to minimize their transaction
costs. Even Bonardi et al. (2005), whose approach is to look at how businesses can influence public
opinion and thus government policy, do not suggest the existence of institutions that shape and
constrain the CPA process. In this way, the current theory seems much like the management theory
of the 1970s (Hoskisson, Wan, Yiu, & Hitt, 1999), before the ideas of the Behavioral Theory of
the Firm (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012), Resource Dependence (Wry et al., 2013),
and Institutional theory (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005) came to prominence. These theories
argued that the driving force behind change in organizations is not efficiency, but power, whether
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it be exerted by those who have control over resources or whether it result from cultural pressures
(Scott, 2004). Although some scholars fought the transition away from the earlier, more simplistic
construct (Strauss & Hanson, 1997), in general most scholars have appreciated the greater nuance
and improved predictive power of these newer theories (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). I believe it is
time for CPA theory to take a similar step up in sophistication.
2.3. Problems with the Current Approach
The political market theory appears to insufficiently addresses at least three realities of
modern politics. First is the importance of applying pressure to achieve political ends. The political
market theory seems to treat most interactions between businesses and politicians as though the
politicians have all the power (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008). In fact, businesses
have significant power which they activate by applying pressure upon politicians who do not
respond to more amicable approaches. This reality is demonstrated by the rising importance of
issue advertising. These ads, produced and paid for independently of the candidate’s campaign,
sometimes support a candidate’s position but more often attack the opponent’s position (Bebchuk
& Jackson, 2010). Such independent issue ads must be effective, or they would not have become
so common. Indeed, over the past few years, interest groups have spent more money on such issue
advertising than on lobbying, much of it aimed at attacking politicians who disagree with the
advertiser rather than rewarding its supporters (Quinn & Young, 2015) Advertising sponsored by
business interests to attack incumbent politicians opposed to their position does not fit into one of
the strategies described in the political market theory. Yet this strategy has become an important
tool in the CPA arsenal due to its value in applying pressure to politicians. Thus, the theory needs
to be expanded to explain this activity.
Second, the political market theory posits information as one of the currencies demanders
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of public policy can exchange with suppliers. While information is of value to politicians, they
have no difficulty obtaining it (Schuler et al., 2002). According to OpenSecrets.org, there were 11,
243 active registered lobbyists in Washington in 2016 (The Center for Responsive Politics, 2017).
Contrast that number with the 535 members of Congress, and one can see that there are over twenty
lobbyists for each elected official. Such a volume of information sources means that the challenge
facing elected officials is not in obtaining information in the first place, but in choosing which
information to prioritize (Rerup, 2009). Indeed, in their seminal political science article, Hall and
Deardorff (2006) argued that the primary role of lobbyists was not to persuade elected officials of
their clients’ position, but to simply develop relationships with legislators that enable them to assist
the officials in determining which information to prioritize. The political market theorists would
argue that the financial contributions or other political support the demanders provide will entice
the supplier to value their information more highly than other information. Such logic, however,
reveals that the information, in and of itself, is not a valuable currency. Thus, one of the three main
strategies suggested by this theory has limited value.
Third, the political market theory does not account for the importance of ideology in
political decision-making. Ideology in a political context has been defined as “worldviews which
include preferences regarding social outcomes, and theories about how those outcomes can be
obtained" (Simons & Ingram, 2004: 33). Both the demanders and the suppliers have preexisting
political views that impact their responsiveness to certain arguments. Evidence of such preexisting
views abounds. For example, research has found that while corporate campaign contributions go
to candidates in both political parties, the contributions by the top managers skew toward
Republicans (Hillman et al., 2004). If the top managers were simply acting in their financial
interest when they made contributions, their personal contributions should match those of their
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firm. Instead, this disjunction demonstrates that while the managers make sure the firm’s
contributions benefit the shareholders as their duty dictates, when it comes to the managers’ own
personal money, they contribute based upon a different analysis. Similarly, cigarette manufacturer
Philip Morris is the largest provider of business campaign contributions in the United States
(Schuler et al., 2002). Despite its munificence, however, a committed anti-smoking advocate
serving in office would be unlikely to respond to entreaties from this firm. No amount of campaign
contributions or political support will change that fact.
The problem the political market theory has explaining the impact of ideology and prior
prejudices goes even further. For example, scholars have shown that businesses have a particularly
difficult time fighting the opposition of ideologically driven interest groups (Bonardi et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the theory assumes that the voters are a blank canvas (Bonardi et al., 2005). Voters,
however, already have certain experiences, perceptions, and prejudices that will inform their
opinions on issues. That is why the railroad industry was able to impact public opinion against
multitrailer trucks with ads showing large rigs in the rearview mirror of a family car (Weisensee,
1991); or why with so many people knowing a gay person, public opinion on same sex marriage
has changed so rapidly (Coontz, 2014). The impact of these ideological factors is not explained by
the political market theory.
The literature based upon the political market theory has tried to address these deficiencies
in a number of ways, including referencing how high competitiveness among policy demanders in
a political marketplace will limit a politician’s options; how certain issues become election issues
that are salient with the voters while others do not (Bonardi et al., 2005); and how business interests
sometimes need to negotiate difficult interactions between legislators, the executive, and regulators
(Schuler et al., 2002), to name a few. These examples point to the fact that this theory is ripe for
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extension.
As systems theory makes clear, organizations operate as partially open systems impacted
by the environment (Karniouchina, Carson, Short, & Ketchen, 2013; Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972;
Scott, 2004). Implicitly, the market theory of CPA recognizes this fact, since firms engage in the
political process to access resources they need, establish legitimacy, and otherwise respond to
important environmental inputs (Boyd, 1990; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa,
& Justis, 2008; Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2004; Wry et al., 2013). However, as
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) pointed out, there are two sides to any such arrangement. Thus, on
the one hand, the market theory recognizes the fact that the policy demanders must engage with
their environment. However, it fails to recognize that the policy suppliers must engage with their
environment as well. These environmental constraints upon the CPA interaction can be
characterized as internal and external. The internal constraint is the policy suppliers’ ideology,
defined as “worldviews which include preferences regarding social outcomes, and theories about
how those outcomes can be obtained" (Simons & Ingram, 2004: 33). As Holburn and Bergh (2008)
pointed out, the ideology of the suppliers will impact their policy position, and a policy demander
should develop a CPA strategy taking the suppliers’ ideology into consideration. Indeed, ideology
is why many policy suppliers became involved in the political process in the first place (Thomsen,
2014). As a result, an overarching theory of CPA that does not recognize the impact of the policy
suppliers’ ideology on their actions will be incomplete.
Similarly, there is an external environmental constraint that will impact the policy positions
of the supplier. Political forces have been divided into those that have achieved saliency and those
that have not (Bonardi & Keim, 2005). When an issue is salient, it has engendered enough political
support in the community that it can impact the election (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Nigam & Ocasio,

14
2010). Since the primary goal of most elected officials is reelection or election to a higher office
(Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, & Stone, 2006), elected officials will be loath to take a position contrary
to a salient issue (see also Bonardi & Keim, 2005). It is worth noting that issue salience may differ
from location to location (Maestas et al., 2006; Simons & Ingram, 2004; Thomsen, 2014). Thus
an issue that has achieved salience in one political district might not have the same importance in
another (Palazzolo & Moscardelli, 2006). For example, farm issues may be very important in states
such as Iowa or Nebraska that are very rural and whose economies depend upon agriculture, while
such issues may have limited impact in more heavily urbanized states such as Massachusetts or
Florida. As a result, for each issue, a policy demander will have to determine whether each supplier
is constrained by the potential saliency of a political issue in his or her district.
Political trends that result in salient issues also constrain appointed officials as well as
elected ones, just less directly. Appointed regulators have constituencies just as do elected ones:
they are the elected officials who can reappoint the regulators, determine their budget and their
legal mandate (Bonardi et al., 2006; Holburn & Bergh, 2008). While it is true that elected
regulators tend to be more responsive to consumer demands than do appointed ones (Holburn &
Bergh, 2008), a regulator who takes positions completely at odds with the positions demanded by
the elected official’s electorate is unlikely to be reappointed (Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Levine &
Forrence, 1990). Just as the elected officials' own positions can be held against them, so too can
the positions taken by officials they appoint or oversee. As a result, appointed officials need to be
aware of the political trends that might result in issues becoming salient for the elected officials
who appoint and oversee them.
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2.4. Describing the Political Landscape
2.4.1. Why Would Businesses Engage in CPA?
Businesses do engage in CPA (Hillman et al., 2004; McDonnell & Werner, 2016), begging
the question of why would they. Indeed, research aimed at finding a relationship between
investment in CPA and firm performance has been inconclusive at best (Aggarwal, Rajesh, Felix,
& Tracy Yue, 2012; Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Hadani et al., 2015; Hadani & Schuler,
2013). To explain this apparent paradox, I subdivide firms engaging in CPA into two groups, one
where the firms are impacted by government activity, the other where executives take advantage
of the resources at their disposal to pursue their own personal political agendas. I will explain the
activity of each group with a different theory.
The first group, where their business is impacted at some level by government activity, will
be a much larger group than some might suspect (Porter, 1980). Firms falling within this category
would be those who face government regulation of some kind (Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hansen
& Mitchell, 2000; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008; Shaffer, 1995), those for whom the
government is a significant purchaser of their products and services (Hillman et al., 2004; Porter,
1980), or those directly impacted by government policy, such as trade policy, for example
(Lindeque & McGuire, 2010; Schuler, 1996). For this category of businesses, resource dependence
theory helps explain the firms’ reasoning (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003;
Wry et al., 2013). In essence, these firms will be heavily dependent upon resources controlled by
the politicians, and similarly, politicians will be heavily dependent upon resources the businesses
can provide them, such as campaign funding or constituency support (Dess & Beard, 1984; Oliver,
1991; Pajunen, 2006). This mutual dependency will create an equilibrium prompting each party to
assist the other (Marquis & Qian, 2014). In such cases, however, the parties will attempt to disrupt
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this equilibrium, thus giving them more power over the other party (Boyd, 1990; Casciaro &
Piskorski, 2005; Green & Welsh, 1988; Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009). Businesses
engaging in activities to change the dynamic such that they have more power over the politicians
rather than vice versa is the essence of CPA.
On the other hand, there will be a group of firms investing in CPA who do not rely so
heavily on government input, and in those cases, agency theory will assist in understanding their
reasoning (Hadani et al., 2015). Where executives might have resources at their disposal and the
discretion to use them, these executives might engage in CPA to support their own political agenda
(Hadani, 2012). Unfortunately, under American law, the ability of shareholders to restrict such
activities is severely limited (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010). The end result will be top executives
engaging in CPA for their own ideological purposes rather than for reasons that benefit the firm.
In these cases, the executives will use the same CPA tools aimed at shifting power to them rather
than the politicians, but with the goal of forwarding their own political agenda rather than
increasing shareholder value. I believe both kinds of firms exist and engage in CPA, and the
activities they use to achieve their goal of gaining power over the politicians is the subject of the
balance of this chapter.
2.4.2. A New Typology of CPA
I propose an extension of current CPA theory in which I build upon Hillman and Hitt (1999)
to add nuance to their typology of political activities. Under the Political Landscape model that I
propose here, the politicians, including legislators, regulators, and other public officials, must
negotiate a challenging terrain. In crossing this landscape, the politicians will consider various
topographical features that create barriers to their passage. These topological features are based
upon the motivation of the politicians, and they include the ideology of the politician, the political
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trends in the politician’s constituency, and the pre-existing relationships the politician has. The
political market theory focuses on currency that the demanders of public policy, such as
businesses, can give to the politicians in an effort to gain their support. Thus, the political market
theory takes into consideration the need for corporate actors to appeal to what motivates political
actors—essentially their interest in retaining office and expanding their power (Bonardi et al.,
2006; Schuler et al., 2002). However, the political market theory does not take into consideration
the impact of ideology on the process, something that has a central impact on American electoral
politics (Thomsen, 2014). Research has shown that by far the most important motivating factor
that induces a candidate to run for office is an ideological interest in one or a set of political issues
(Baer & Hartmann, 2014).
Once they decide to run for office, candidates need to build support, which they accomplish
by establishing relationships with individuals and organizations that can provide them with money
and grassroots support (Schuler et al., 2002). It has been shown that the amount of campaign
contributions are correlated with the amount of time a candidate spends with the donor (Schuler et
al., 2002: 5). Furthermore, the second most important motivator for a candidate to run for office is
his or her family, friends, and other relationships (Baer & Hartmann, 2014). In this way, these
relationships become a central part of the policy politician’s support system, and they cannot be
ignored by demanders seeking to influence the public official (Peress, 2013).
Finally, elected officials cannot ignore policy issues that gain the attention of the broader
constituency. When an issue gains saliency, it goes from being ignored by a public overwhelmed
with their own concerns to an issue of electoral importance (Bonardi et al., 2005). Once such issues
gain the public’s attention, corporate actors will likely be unable to influence the direction of the
issue (Bonardi et al., 2005). Elected officials can influence their constituencies, but such efforts
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will deplete political capital that they could otherwise use for another issue perhaps dearer to their
heart or for their own re-election (Matsubayashi, 2013). Thus elected officials will be loath to take
steps that alienate their constituencies, even despite the requests of a corporate supporter.
As a result, each time a business has an issue of concern, it must analyze for each politician
the nature of his or her ideology, the political trends in the politician’s constituency, and the
politician’s relationships. In each case, the business will have to ask itself whether each feature in
the political landscape will make the politician more or less receptive to the requests of the
business, and whether the business is able to impact any of these features. Thus the businesses
have a two-way relationship with these features: they must determine if the features make the
politician more or less likely to be responsive, and simultaneously, whether the business can
impact that feature. In this way, the business could formulate a strategy to achieve the public policy
outcome it seeks.
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Figure 1 - The Political Landscape Model
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The starting point for this analysis is certainly the politician’s ideology. If the politician is
by nature hostile to the business’s policy position, the business will only waste time and money
courting that official. Fortunately, in most cases, the public official will be quite open about his or
her position on the issue. There may already be a public record reflecting that position. As a result,
research on this question is typically not difficult. I expect there to be an inverse U-shaped
relationship regarding the responsiveness of the politician to the business. On the one hand, if the
politician is set against the business’s position, as with, for example, a cigarette maker approaching
an anti-smoking advocate, the business need not attempt to influence that official. On the other
hand, if the politician is in fact predisposed to the position of the business, there is no need to
influence that politician. In fact, that politician may have the potential for becoming an ally of the
business in achieving its public policy outcome. The bulk of the businesses' attention, however,
should be directed at those politicians who have no position on the issue because of either lack of
knowledge or lack of interest. Ironically, it is those public officials who will become the initial
targets of the business’s efforts.
Once the firm has determined the extent to which the politician’s ideology will leave him
or her open to the business’s requests, the business must determine its ability to influence the
politician. Here is where the information strategy pointed to in the political markets theory
becomes useful. If the business has the politician’s initial support, the business only needs to
maintain its relationship with the politician in an effort to bolster that position. If the politician is
ideologically opposed to the business’s position, there is no point in approaching that politician.
However, if the politician is uncommitted on the issue for whatever reason, that politician could
be open to the business providing information on the issue. In this way, the business could
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influence the politician’s views, emphasizing that feature of the political landscape on the issue
such that the politician is pushed toward the business’s position.
The second step in the business’s analysis should be to consider the relationships of the
politician. Various means exist to establish a relationship with the politician, including making
financial contributions (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), providing political support within the politician’s
constituency (Bonardi et al., 2005), hiring former public officials who enjoy a relationship with
the business (Lester et al., 2008), or encouraging current employees to take government positions
in which they might establish strong relationships with the politicians (Hillman, Zardkoohi, &
Bierman, 1999; Johnson & Kwak, 2013). Each of these methods has been used to that end. Just as
important, however, is determining whom else the politician has relationships with. For example,
even if the politician has no firm ideological position on an issue, the politician could be closely
allied with a lobbyist, a constituent, or another individual who does. Or, for that matter, the
politician might have a strong relationship with a lobbyist or another activist whose support the
business can gain. Just like any human being, the politician does not want to disappoint his or her
supporters and friends. In this way, just as the business analyzed the status of the politician’s
ideology and from there determined if a strategy was available to influence that ideology, so too
must the business determine if it has a relationship with the politician or if its opponents do, and
if not, whether it can establish one. Thus, the business again establishes where the barrier lies on
the political landscape, and based upon that analysis determines whether it can impact that feature
such that it pushes the politician toward the business’s position.
Finally, the business must determine the political trends in the politician’s constituency.
That analysis, however, requires several steps. First, the business must figure out who exactly the
constituency of the politician is. In some cases, that answer might be readily apparent, as with
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elected officials who represent a district. In other cases, the answer might not be so obvious. All
politicians have a constituency, just as all businesses have customers. For example, certain
regulators are elected. In those cases, their constituency would be their electorate. Certain public
officials are appointed. In those cases, the business must ascertain who appoints the public official
and whether it be an individual or some kind of board, commission, or legislative body. Even
public officials who are not elected and who are not seeking reappointment have constituencies.
Regulators, for example, do not want to see their decisions overturned by the governing executive,
the legislature, or the courts (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). As a result, they are constrained in
their actions based upon the views of those parties. In this way, those regulators who may seem at
first to act in an unconstrained fashion actually have constituencies who can influence their actions
(Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). Most attractive for business interests are those regulators or
officials who view the business as one of their constituents. While much attention has been directed
at the concern over “regulatory capture” (Admati & Hellwig, 2013), in which regulators appear to
act on behalf of the industry they regulate, the nature of this relationship can also be less suspect.
For example, the business may employ many citizens in the official’s district, or have an important
facility located there. And in some cases, the regulated parties actually provide some if not all of
the funding for the agency (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2011). Some elected
officials might even have multiple constituencies, such as legislative leaders who on the one hand
represent a specific district while on the other hand also rely upon the votes of their fellow
legislators to maintain their leadership positions. As a result, determining the politician’s
constituency might be less clear than one might expect.
Once the politician’s constituency has been established, the business needs to use that
information as a basis to determine whether the public official will be responsive to the business’s
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requests or not. Returning to my example of the cigarette manufacturer, while that firm might be
unwelcome in the office of a fierce anti-smoking advocate, it would receive a very different
reception from a legislator who represents a district with a large number of tobacco farmers. Even
if the public official is personally ambivalent on the issue, he or she will likely vote with the
interests of the district to assist in re-election. Similarly, representatives from Michigan will not
vote against the automakers, nor will officials from Washington State vote against the aviation
industry. As a result, the successful advocates for businesses will have a strong sense of the various
limitations placed upon the actions of the public official as a result of his or her constituents’
interests.
The analysis, however, should not end there. Indeed, this is one feature of the political
landscape that may be susceptible to influence by the business. Earlier, I discussed the example of
firms engaging in indirect political action aimed at impacting elections (Bebchuk & Jackson,
2010). Businesses do periodically engage in grassroots lobbying efforts or public relations
programs aimed at changing the opinion of the politician’s constituents (Bonardi et al., 2005). The
two other strategies proposed by the political market theorists, providing money and information,
fit squarely within the domain of this barrier. The reason that elected officials are interested in
those two strategies is that money and support will assist the politicians in their re-election
campaign (Hillman et al., 2004). While it is true that the ultimate goal of the business in providing
support and contributions is to establish a favorable relationship with the politician, from the
politician’s perspective, the value of this assistance is in providing resources for the politician’s
campaign. Evidence of this fact comes the reality that many corporate political contributions are
made in highly contested races. If the goal were simply to buy access, the focus of contributions
would primarily be to incumbent politicians sitting in safe seats. The difference is that these
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candidates with a secure position are not asking for contributions because they do not need them.
Instead, most campaign contributions go to the candidates with the toughest races simply because
those candidates need the money to finance their campaigns. Thus, as with the other two elements
to the landscape, businesses might be able to influence this barrier too. Unfortunately, making a
significant impact in this area can be very expensive (Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, & Bonardi, 2012),
so this approach works best when combined with efforts to impact the other two elements.
An unfortunate corollary to the above arguments is that there will be issues where the
business will be simply unable to achieve its goal given the environment at the time. For example,
if it turns out that the factors of the political landscape make it so that sixty out of one hundred
U.S. senators are not inclined to support the business’s position, the business has two choices.
First, it may attempt to change the landscape such that a number of the U.S. senators will be able
to move to its position. If the business is unable to accomplish such a change, it will have to take
the other option: essentially it will be forced to wait until the political landscape changes such that
its position fits better with the political landscape factors of a majority of elected officials. Such
an alignment of forces occurred in the wake of the recent financial crisis when Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill. Many financial institutions did not favor the proposed
reforms, but they found they were unable to impact the debate much due to the broader political
trends among taxpayers outraged over the bailouts (Blinder, 2013; Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, 2011). Thus, the political landscape did not favor the demands of this corporate
interest. Such an analysis will be important for firms to conduct prior to expending the time, effort,
and resources necessary to mount an effective CPA campaign on any given issue.
A review of existing research provides support for this typology. For example, Hall and
Deardorff (2006) argued that the greatest value lobbyists provide to their clients is not their ability
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to convince uncommitted legislators to support a business’s policy position, but in the close
relationship they develop with certain supportive politicians for whom the lobbyists can help
prioritize information. Thus, Hall and Deardorff simultaneously discount the value of information
as a currency of exchange while also emphasizing the value of relationships with politicians as
being a key element to CPA. Similarly, Bonardi (2011) argues that relationships with politicians
might be one of the few resources available to businesses that are valuable, rare and nonsubstitutable, while acknowledging that in the alternative, businesses can hire lobbyists able to
provide access to these relationships. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) found that lobbyists are more
likely to financially contribute to legislators with whom they have longer relationships, supporting
the conception of financial support as a reflection of the relationship factor, as opposed to a form
of exchange in and of itself. Finally, the findings of Lord (2000) provide empirical support for the
idea that information is not helpful to CPA efforts, but engagement with the politician and his or
her constituencies is.
The analysis described above is mapped out in the decision tree included as Figure 2.

26
Figure 2 - CPA Decision Tree

2.4.3. Theoretical Grounding
I find support for this typology in the concept of legitimacy from institutional theory as
described by Suchman (1995). Institutional theory posits that individuals and organizations operate
in an environment characterized by certain beliefs, norms and assumptions that can be referred to
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as “institutions” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Individuals and organizations
seek to attain legitimacy by conforming to the demands of these institutions (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Indeed, the more
formal structures that many would envision upon hearing the word “institution” are actually simply
enactments of the beliefs, norms and assumptions that govern society (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
While it is true that institutions thus constrain individuals and organizations, people also have the
ability to modify institutions over time (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). This theory explains quite well
the realities of CPA discussed above. For instance, using the example of the railroad ads aimed at
defeating legislation to allow multitrailer rigs, these ads played upon certain beliefs held by voters,
namely that families driving on the highway should be safe. By appealing to that concern, the
railroad industry made this issue into one that was salient with the public, thus positively affecting
the re-election of the incumbent, and making the politician less open to the entreaties of the
trucking industry (Bonardi et al., 2005). This particular case was a strikingly successful example
of CPA in action, and it incorporated all the elements of institutional theory; that is, the railroad
industry appealed to existing prejudices and beliefs, modified them, and in so doing, created
constraints that limit the options of the politicians and competing industries. Consequently, it
appears that institutional theory has a strong application in the study of CPA.
Suchman (1995) argues that organizations can achieve three types of legitimacy:
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy. This typology of legitimacy has achieved widespread
acceptance in the literature (Stevens, Xie, & Peng, 2016). Just as Suchman (1995) argued that
there are three forms of legitimacy that can constrain and shape the environment, I argue that there
exist three forces that govern the relationships between various political actors. First, pragmatic
legitimacy is achieved when an organization convinces a certain public to support its position, thus
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turning that public into a constituency (Suchman, 1995: 578). Similarly, all politicians must be
cognizant of maintaining their support among their constituencies. For elected officials, if they fail
to maintain such support, they will be defeated in their election; for appointed officials, they will
lose the support of their elected superiors, resulting at least in a reduction of resources and authority
and at worst a removal from office (see Bonardi et al., 2006). Suchman (1995) argues that such
legitimacy can be achieved in three forms. Exchange legitimacy involves convincing publics that
an organization will do something specific for the potential constituents in exchange for their
support. Such efforts appear strikingly similar to the promises politicians frequently make in an
effort to build support (McGraw, Lodge, & Jones, 2002; Sulkin, 2009). Second, influence
legitimacy involves creating an overall perception that an organization is broadly supportive of the
public’s priorities. Again, this approach echoes politicians’ frequent claims that they stand on the
side of their constituents and can be expected to fight for their interests. Finally, dispositional
legitimacy creates the perception among constituents that the organization is trustworthy and can
be counted on to reflect the public’s values. The recent presidential election with its extremely
personal attacks on both sides points out how valuable the perception that a candidate shares the
public’s values is to a politician. In each of these cases, the publics will have pre-existing
perceptions, some of which might be very hard to change, that will influence the politicians’ ability
to achieve this form of legitimacy (Blinder, Ford, & Ivarsflaten, 2013). These pre-existing
perceptions, when they achieve a certain saliency with the public, can be referred to as “political
trends.” Since politicians must maintain this form of legitimacy to be reelected or reappointed,
these trends will constrain their actions. As a result, for a policy position supported by a business
to receive support from a politician, it must consider overall political trends of that politician’s
constituency, either acting within those trends or changing them. Thus, the first element of my
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typology of constraints that govern the relationship among political actors is the trends of the
politicians’ constituencies.
Second, moral legitimacy occurs when an organization has achieved a positive normative
perception among its publics, essentially creating a sense of trust for its constituents that it can be
counted on to do the right thing (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Achieving such
legitimacy can be very difficult, since the slightest perception that the organization is insincere in
its moral leadership will undermine its efforts. To attain such legitimacy, organizations will
employ individuals called “moral entrepreneurs” to bolster the organizations’ claims. Politicians
face a particularly difficult challenge in achieving such legitimacy due to the negative perception
so many people have of them (Hart, 2004; McGraw et al., 2002). To address this difficulty,
politicians will rely upon groups of supporters to act as their ambassadors, signaling to other
potential supporters and contributors that the politician is one of strong moral standing (Alt,
Lassen, & Marshall, 2016; Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998; den Hond et al., 2014; Foss & Lindenberg,
2013; Hsu, 2004; Peress, 2013; Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). Thus, maintenance of these moral
ambassadors is essential for politicians. This need will make it very hard for politicians to vote in
a way that one of these key ambassadors opposes. As a result, such relationships will constrain the
possible actions of politicians, and they thus become the second element of this typology of factors
that govern CPA.
Finally, cognitive legitimacy arises due to the fact that we live in a “cognitively chaotic”
environment (Baron, 1998; Suchman, 1995). Within such circumstances, individuals will rely
upon biases and heuristics, “simplifying strategies that individuals can use to make decisions,
especially in uncertain and complex conditions” (Busenitz & Barney, 1997: 13). One such heuristic
that is especially useful in a political environment is ideology, defined earlier as the worldviews
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of the actor (Simons & Ingram, 2004: 33). Indeed, research has shown the central impact of
ideology on American electoral politics (Thomsen, 2014), and it is by far the most important
motivating factor that induces a candidate to run for office (Baer & Hartmann, 2014). As a result,
political actors and their constituents will look at the world through the lens of their ideology. It is
for this reason that the currency of information is of little value to political actors. In effect,
political actors will disregard information that disagrees with their ideology in a process called
confirmation bias (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Thus, even if one believes that politicians have the
cognitive resources available to pay attention to the information businesses bring to them, then
such information will either be privileged or ignored based upon its agreement with the politician’s
ideology. As a result, more important to the cause of a specific policy position than the delivery of
supposedly valuable information would be the level of agreement that information has with the
politician’s ideology (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). In this way, ideology forms a final
constraint advocates must consider.
2.4.4. Understanding the Impact of Political Parties on CPA
Strategy researchers view institutions as resources that can be extracted from the
environment to assist an organization in achieving its goals (Suchman, 1995: 576). A similar view
can be taken of politicians who extract resources from the environment to assist them in achieving
their political goals, including reelection, reappointment, and the expansion of their influence
(Bonardi et al., 2006). Thus, contrary to the political market theory which characterizes the
politicians as the ones with all the power that must be essentially purchased by businesses,
politicians and businesses engaged in CPA are actually mutually dependent. Politicians need the
businesses as a source of the resources that enable them to negotiate the political landscape;
similarly, businesses need the policy-making ability of the politicians (Hillman et al., 2004). Given
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the fact that there is mutual dependency and limited resources, it appears that resource dependency
theory has an application here (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Rogan & Greve, 2015; Wry et al., 2013).
Pursuant to resource dependency theory, actors will seek avenues to reduce their dependency and
thus shift the balance of power into their favor at the expense of the other party (Casciaro &
Piskorski, 2005; Green & Welsh, 1988). Thus, in districts where there is no other institutional
player who can be an effective supply for the resources the politicians need, they will be extremely
dependent upon the support of business interests engaging in CPA. However, in districts where
one political party or the other is dominant, the parties themselves can be a source for the
politicians, thus reducing the influence of the business community.
Political parties serve as important players in the political process (Williams-Wyche,
2014). As shown in Figure 1, political parties provide an option to politicians who seek an
alternative to relying upon the support of business. While from time to time the political party will
take a policy position favored by the business, this does not equate a political party with the
business. The distinction between the two is clear: businesses engaged in CPA are, by definition,
looking for something from the politicians; political parties, however, have as a purpose serving
their members, in particular their elected officials. For example, while the Koch brothers may be
strong supporters of mostly Republican candidates, and while George Soros may be a strong
supporter of mostly Democratic candidates, there will be times that the interests of those
individuals may diverge from the interests of the elected officials they support (Alexander, 2014).
No matter how closely two individuals may agree philosophically, there will inevitably come
issues where the two disagree. There may come an issue where the disagreement is so intense that
the business may decide to stop supporting the elected official. The political party, however, will
rarely abandon the elected official. There have been times elected officials choose to leave a party.
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Sometimes that departure is based upon a belief that the “party has moved away” from the elected
official. There have been elected officials, even high-ranking ones, who have been defeated for reelection in their party primary. In all these cases, however, the party as an institution did not turn
on the elected official. The ideology of the party’s rank and file may have changed such that the
elected official no longer represents the party’s mainstream, but ultimately, the party as an
institution remains supportive of its elected officials (see Hershey, 2007).
As such, the political parties constitute countervailing forces against the influence of the
businesses engaged in CPA. Even when political parties may have strong ideological ties to a
business, the role of the party is to enable the elected official to remain independent of the pressures
the business is bringing to bear. Much as the corporate interest may look to find candidates
ideologically aligned with its position, much as the corporate interest may work to influence the
political trends in the politician’s constituency, and much as it may seek to establish relationships
with important elected officials and regulators, the political party will stand in a position to allow
the politician to retain his or her independence. Thus while the corporate interest may push a
specific ideological position, the elected official will find refuge from that position in the
overarching institution of the party. Similarly, while the businesses may work to establish
relationships with the elected officials, the party will provide them with other avenues to find
supporters. Finally, while businesses engaged in CPA may attempt various strategies to influence
the politician’s constituency, the political parties will provide the officials with a base of support
to protect themselves from that influence. It is often surprising to those uninvolved in the political
process to realize that in a major contested election only a very small percentage of voters is
actually undecided (Vavreck, 2016). Thus officials’ membership in a party immediately provides
them with a base of support that serves to protect them from the influence of the businesses.
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Given the uneven distribution of supporters of one political party or another among the
various states and legislative districts, there are certain states or districts where one political party
will have an advantage over the other (Hershey, 2007). On the other hand, there are states and
districts where the electoral power of the two parties is more evenly matched. Based upon the
above analysis, the more influence the political party has in a constituency, the less influence will
the businesses engaged in CPA have, and vice versa. Thus in districts where one political party
dominates, the elected official will feel free to act independently of the demands of the special
interests. However, in districts where neither party dominates, the elected official will have to turn
to the businesses engaged in CPA to impact the political landscape factors he or she needs to be
re-elected.
2.4.5. Transactional Versus Relational Approach to CPA
Some scholars have raised the question as to whether corporations should take a proactive
or reactive approach to CPA (Hillman et al., 2004). The proactive approach has been called
“relational,” since it involves the firm developing ongoing relationships with the politicians who
impact its business. Examples of where such an approach makes sense would be in industries that
are heavily regulated, such as utilities, or where the firm is such a large player in the market that
political issues come up frequently, such as with General Motors or other very large companies.
In contrast, the reactive approach has been called “transactional,” since it treats government as
something that is not a concern of the firm until government action might directly impact an
interest of the company. At that time, the firm would have to take steps to address the specific
political transaction that threatens its well-being (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). Hillman et al.
(2004) have argued that more research is needed on this question.
I argue, however, that a transactional approach is not an either/or alternative to a relational
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approach. Pursuant to the political landscape model, the two are actually entirely different
constructs. On the one hand, a relational approach enables the firm to impact one of the three large
factors that influence the politicians. Such relationships, however, can essentially be outsourced
by hiring lobbyists as needed. As a result, the question of whether a firm should take a relational
approach to politics or not is simply one of transaction costs (Kingsley et al., 2012). Essentially, if
a firm finds itself in frequent engagement with government due to either its industry or its size,
then it might be more cost effective to bring the relationship-building with public officials in-house
rather than hiring lobbyists as needed. On the other hand, a transactional approach is what the firm
needs to take every time it faces a public policy challenge. For every issue, the managers must
consider who the politicians on that issue are. Then, the company must analyze the issue’s
relationship to the three factors of the political landscape. Finally, the firm will be able to determine
whether it can influence the decision, and if so, how. Thus, the concepts of transactional and
relational approaches to corporate political activity are not alternatives. Instead, they are entirely
different dimensions.
Some might say that public policy is constantly evolving, and inserting oneself in the
process of developing that policy is the essence of a relational approach. While this observation is
accurate, the forward motion of policy is always achieved in significant moments, or critical
events: an election, a committee vote, or the promulgation of a new rule, for example (Chandler,
2014; Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2015). At each of these moments, businesses will need to determine which
outcome they prefer and whether the outcome of that moment is sufficiently salient to motivate
them to expend resources to influence it. The nature of political decision-making is much more
dualistic than in the business world. Where several businesses can successfully operate in a single
market, politics always results in at least one winner and one loser. While businesses may involve
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themselves in the policy-making process over time with the aim of establishing relationships with
politicians that they can benefit from in the future, their ultimate goal must be achieving the desired
outcome in their critical moment. Thus, successful practitioners of CPA will approach each
moment as a new transaction, and they will deploy what resources they have available at that time
to achieve their aim in that moment.
The fact that periodically groups with seemingly incompatible interests will cooperate in
their efforts supports the argument that successful CPA is always transactional. For example, in
the recent debate over approval of the Keystone XL pipeline, certain labor unions allied themselves
with the energy industry (Yglesias, 2014). Overall, these groups appear to be unlikely collaborators
(Aronoff, 2015), but on this one particular issue, their interests converge. For the union, it was the
potential for high paying jobs (Yglesias, 2014). For the energy companies, it was access to cheaper
oil (Transcanada Corporation, 2010). Thus, these two groups, historically at odds, and still
opposing each other on a number of issues, found common ground on this one particular issue.
Such unusual alliances are common in policymaking, leading Charles Dudley Warner to write that
“politics makes strange bedfellows.” Thus, successful practitioners of CPA will be able to set
aside historic alliances and enmities in favor of a transactional analysis that determines what is the
best position for the business on that issue at that time.
Taking such a calculated approach will generally not damage the business’s long-term CPA
efforts. There will be times when a firm has a policy position that conflicts with other factors
influencing an elected official. Just because that politician might not be inclined to support the
business’s position as a result of the conflict with the other factors, does not mean that the politician
will never support the business’s position, just not on that particular issue. Thus the business cannot
afford to damage the relationship over one issue, since it might need that politician’s support in
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future issues. Successful businesses will thus be able to separate each issue from the other. By
understanding the political landscape informing the decision of the politician, the corporate player
will see why the politician cannot support it on that issue, and it will be able to move on to other
politicians whose landscape might favor the business’s position without jeopardizing the firm's
relationship with any single official.
The above theoretical analysis leads us to a proposition that could form the subject of future
research:
Proposition 1: Businesses engaged in CPA will approach each new issue as a separate
transaction. In this way, they might be able to garner support from politicians who were unable to
support the business’s position on other policy issues due to (a) the politician’s ideology, (b)
political trends in the politician’s constituency, or (c) the relationships of the politician.
2.5. Hypotheses
2.5.1. Three institutional constraints impacting CPA
In this way, it appears that the political market theory can be extended. Rather than
characterizing as currency of exchange two of the three tools at the disposal of policy demanders
– money and political support – I will characterize them as means of building relationships. Rather
than ignoring the contextual factors within which these relationships take place, I consider the
impact of the policy suppliers’ ideology and the trends within their constituencies that might result
in issues achieving saliency. The final element of the political market theory, information, might
be of questionable value to the policy suppliers, however. Policy suppliers likely face information
overload (Schuler et al., 2002), since demanders of every kind will be coming to them providing
information to bolster their case, and since the suppliers separately will have sources of
information such as their staffs or other governmental organizations (Schuler, 1996; Shaffer,
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1995). Policy suppliers will, by definition, have high social capital, since they were able to win the
votes of sufficient constituents to be elected. High social capital has been linked to information
overload (Oldroyd & Morris, 2012). Similarly, political activity by suppliers has been found to be
demanding of time and effort (Shaffer, 1995). Such demands are analogous to those placed upon
entrepreneurs who have been shown to suffer from information overload (Baron, 1998). Indeed,
firms tend to spend far more money on lobbying than they do on political contributions (Hillman
et al., 2004; Johnson & Kwak, 2013), and it appears that suppliers view lobbyists as sources of
funding rather than sources of information (Admati & Hellwig, 2013). This argument finds support
in the political science literature which views lobbying not as persuasion, but as a "legislative
subsidy" aimed at helping the politicians manage the flow of information (Hall & Deardorff, 2006).
Finally, within the realm of CPA, information is rarely unbiased and is frequently used as a weapon
to bolster a policy demander’s particular argument (Bonardi & Keim, 2005), further increasing the
policy suppliers’ skepticism as to the value of any information policy demanders bring to them.
Pursuant to cognitive dissonance theory, ideology tends to result in individuals discounting the
information that disagrees with their beliefs (Harmon-Jones, 2002; Yeo, Xenos, Brossard, &
Scheufele, 2015). Thus, the value of information to policy suppliers is likely so low that it is a poor
medium of exchange in the political market. As a result, I will limit its application in my model.
The model that emerges from this analysis of the current market theory of CPA is one that
still views money and political support as valuable tools, but where these tools are in fact used by
policy demanders to build relationships with the policy suppliers. The impact of such relationships
will be negative as much as positive. Where the market theory notes the attraction such offerings
might have to a policy supplier, it fails to consider the fact that the policy supplier might have ongoing relationships based upon these factors with other policy demanders who oppose the firm
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engaging in the CPA. Indeed, the lengths politicians go to in their effort to assist their long-time
supporters is well documented, such as how the Clintons repeatedly risked their own political
standing in their effort to assist the "friends of Bill" or "FOBs" (Mosk, Ross, Epstein, & Park,
2016). Furthermore, I contextualize the interaction of CPA, noting two constraints that will limit
the actions of the policy suppliers: the internal constraint of the policy suppliers’ ideology, and the
external one of the broader political trends in the policy suppliers’ constituency that might result
in an issue achieving salience and thus having the potential of impacting the reelection of the
supplier. These three constraints, the relationships of the policy suppliers, their ideologies, and the
larger political trends impacting their constituencies can be analogized as topographical barriers
in a landscape around which the policy suppliers must negotiate.
Policy demanders engaging in CPA must be aware of how these three constraints will limit
the options of the policy suppliers they approach for support. Based upon the above analysis, if a
policy demander requests that the policy supplier take a position in opposition to one of these three
factors – the suppliers’ relationships, their ideology, or the political trends affecting their
constituencies – the supplier will be less likely to respond favorably to the demander’s entreaties.
Even so, there remain options available to policy demanders. For example, it has long been known
that firms, especially larger ones, are capable of impacting their environment (Child, 1972). If they
can change their environment to be more favorable for their operations, so too can they impact the
political trends in the constituency of a supplier whose support they seek, bringing attention to
issues they wish to make salient and raising questions about issues that hurt their cause (Bonardi
& Keim, 2005). Indeed, a perfect illustration of how companies engage in such efforts is the
dramatic recent growth of issue advertising, where policy demanders will purchase advertising to
impact the opinions of voters in a certain policy supplier’s district (Hall & Reynolds, 2012).
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Similarly, policy demanders can work to establish relationships with policy suppliers over time
with money and political support (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), thus granting them access to the supplier
and making it so that the supplier will be less likely to support the issue positions of the demander’s
opponents. In the alternative, firms can outsource that process to lobbyists whose business relies
upon the establishment and maintenance of relationships with the policy suppliers. In effect,
lobbyists can “rent” the relationships they have established over time to policy demanders. This
approach seems to be favored by most businesses given the wide disparity between how much
money firms spend on political contributions versus how much they spend on lobbying (Hillman
et al., 2004; Johnson & Kwak, 2013). Finally, although the supplier’s ideology will be the most
difficult factor for a policy demander to impact, this is one area where information might make a
difference. It is possible that under certain circumstances policy demanders will be able to provide
information to suppliers that changes their opinion about a specific issue. This is the one area
where the final element of the political market theory might be useful, albeit in a very limited way.
Generally speaking, it will be particularly difficult for policy suppliers to change their opinion
where they have already publicly pronounced their view, given concerns over the public’s dislike
of politicians’ inconsistent positions (Croco, 2016; Doherty, Dowling, & Miller, 2016). Thus, not
only must demanders engaging in CPA be aware of the three limiting factors in the political
landscape, but they may actually be able to impact them in their effort to push the policy suppliers
to support their position.
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Table 1 - Extending the Market Theory
Market Theory
“Exchange”
Policy demanders request consideration
3 currencies:
1. Money
2. Political Support
3. Information
Environment not considered
No direction as to which suppliers to target

The Political Landscape
Institutional constraints
Struggle per Resource Dependence Theory
3 factors:
1. Relationships
2. Political trends in supplier’s constituency
3. Ideology
Strength of political parties
Target suppliers of moderate ideology

Table 1 clarifies how the Political Landscape theory extends the Market Theory of CPA.
Where the market theory suggests that policy suppliers and demanders engage in an exchange
within which demanders offer suppliers consideration, the Political Landscape envisions a
relationship between the parties governed by three institutions that constrain the actions of the
actors, but the actors can also modify with the application of sufficient effort. Where the market
theory envisions a scenario in which the policy suppliers use their power over policy to extract
currencies from policy demanders, the Political Landscape describes a struggle between the two
parties in which, following resource dependence theory, each party seeks to reduce its dependence
upon the other and thus reduce the other party's power over it (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009).
Where the market theory suggests three currencies the policy demanders offer the suppliers, the
Political Landscape points to three factors that will govern the relationship between the actors: the
suppliers' relationships, the political trends in their constituencies, and their ideology. Where the
market theory does not consider context in its analysis of CPA, the Political Landscape suggests
that the strength of political parties in the suppliers' constituencies will moderate the influence of
CPA upon that supplier. Similarly, since most policy suppliers have pre-existing ideological
beliefs, policy demanders will have to determine what each policy supplier's beliefs are, and then
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target their CPA efforts at those suppliers whose ideology makes them most open to the policy
demanders' entreaties, or at least not opposed to them. In this way, the Political Landscape
approach adds nuance to CPA theory in extending the existing market theory.
The prior analysis leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: When CPA is successful, there will be a positive association between the
position policy demanders support and the policy suppliers’ (a) ideology (b) political trends in
their constituency that might make an issue salient and (c) their personal relationships.
2.5.2. The Impact of Political Parties on CPA
Sitting opposed to the various interest groups attempting to achieve their governmental
agenda are the political parties (Choi et al., 2015). Policy demanders are driven by certain specific
policy goals which could be either ideologically-based such as those advocated by environmental
groups or their pro-growth counterparts, or protection of self-interest such as those advocated by
specific business organizations or labor unions. In contrast, the goal of the political party is the
protection of its elected and appointed officials. The ideological make-up of the parties in the
American system can be quite diverse (Thomsen, 2014; Williams-Wyche, 2014). Thus, the elected
and appointed officials of each political party might range widely in their views, although that
range has narrowed in recent years (Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009). As a result, given their ideological
diversity, the only factor unifying many of these officials might be their party affiliation. In
contrast, what unifies members of organizations that are policy demanders is not their membership
in the group, but the political goal that they share. Thus an environmental group may count
Republicans, Democrats and Independents among its supporters, as would a pro-growth
organization, a politically-active labor union or a firm engaging in CPA. Frequently, there may be
close connections between certain policy demanders and one political party or the other, such as
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the relationship environmental groups and labor unions have with the Democratic party. When
issues arise that may put the group in conflict with the party, however, the group will leave the
party, at least temporarily, to advocate for its policy position. For example, the Democratic party
faced such a challenge when environmental groups and labor unions took opposing positions over
allowing the construction of certain oil and gas pipelines (Yglesias, 2014). In each case, the policy
demander would have supported or opposed policy suppliers based upon their policy position,
while the political parties are unlikely to abandon their support of an official no matter what their
policy view.
In this way, political parties can provide policy suppliers a countervailing force against the
pressures policy demanders may apply to them. While the policy supplier may fear that the policy
demander may withdraw its support or exert its strength to impact the supplier’s political
landscape, the suppliers can be confident in the fact that the institution of their political party will
remain supportive. Certain states and legislative districts will lean heavily toward one party or
another, while other constituencies will be more evenly divided. In those constituencies with a
heavier partisan tilt, the political party will have the ability to essentially deliver the district’s votes
to its chosen candidate (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011), thus decreasing the potential impact policy
demanders can have on the relevant political landscape. In more closely contested districts,
however, the party will lack that ability, resulting in greater potential for the policy demanders to
either help or hurt the suppliers’ reelection effort.
This analysis brings me to my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The influence of business interests will be stronger in legislative districts
where the two political parties are more evenly matched than in those where one party or the other
dominates.
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2.5.3. Effective CPA Targets Undecided Policy Suppliers
Thus far, this paper has addressed what CPA is, what are its ground rules and its limitations.
The question remains how companies do CPA. The first step with any issue will be for policy
demanders to analyze the political landscape of the policy suppliers who are decision-makers on
the issue. In completing this analysis, policy demanders will determine that there are some
suppliers who will be extremely unlikely, if not actively opposed, to the demanders’ position.
Similarly, there will be some suppliers who are likely to be immediately supportive, as determined
by their political landscape. The supplier may have a strong relationship with the demander’s
leadership; or the demander may have a factory in the supplier’s district, thus impacting the
demander’s overall political trends; or the demander may have a pro-business ideology, making
him or her particularly supportive of the demander’s position. With few exceptions, however,
neither group will make up a majority at the beginning of the process, and so the policy demander
will have to engage in further CPA to build support. The target of these CPA efforts, then, would
be the policy suppliers who are neither supportive nor opposed to the demander’s position, since
that is where the policy demander will be able to turn undecided suppliers into supporters,
hopefully resulting in a majority. For each of these undecided suppliers, the policy demander will
have to engage the elements of the political landscape to encourage their support. For example, the
demander might hire a lobbyist who has established relationships with the undecided suppliers,
thus impacting the relationships element of the landscape. Similarly, the demander might employ
issue advertising or grassroots organizing with the aim of making their issue salient with the
constituency who elect the policy supplier, thus impacting the political trends of that supplier’s
district (Hall & Reynolds, 2012; Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler et al., 2002). Finally, the demander
may attempt to impact the supplier’s ideology by providing information supportive of its position.
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Here, however, the policy demander may have the least success. Pursuant to cognitive dissonance
theory, ideology tends to result in individuals discounting the information that disagrees with their
beliefs (Harmon-Jones, 2002). As a result, the most difficult of the landscape’s elements to affect
is likely ideology, and as such, the most ineffective CPA efforts will be those that focus on policy
suppliers who are either ideologically in favor or opposed to the policy demander’s position.
The above analysis leads to my third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between a politician’s ideology
and the CPA the firm engages in with that politician such that the firm will engage in
comparatively less CPA with highly pro-business or highly anti-business politicians than with
those whose attitude toward business issues is more moderate.
2.6. Discussion
I embarked upon this exploration of CPA primarily in response to two realizations. First,
the market-based approach to explaining CPA seemed unable to explain certain realities of the
political environment, such as the ability of businesses and other interests to pressure politicians
to take a certain position, or the resistance of politicians in certain circumstances to offerings of
money, information and constituent organizing, the purported currencies of the market theory.
Second, the market theory in the management sciences, and the similarly influential interest group
theories pioneered by Mancur Olson in political science, have received limited empirical support
for their predictions (Hadani et al., 2015; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hansen et al., 2005; Hillman
et al., 2004; Shaffer, 1995; Zhang, Marquis, & Qiao, 2016). These problems have led some to call
for additional conceptual work in the field (Getz, 2001; Hart, 2004), a call I aim to answer.
By definition, CPA is a nonmarket strategy (Bonardi et al., 2006). It appears that the
difference between market and nonmarket strategies are the stakeholders toward whom the actions

45
are directed (Stevens et al., 2005). Market stakeholders are those with whom the firm has an
economic relationship, such as shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees, and even competing
firms (Stevens et al., 2005). Nonmarket stakeholders are those with whom the interaction takes
place through other than economic means. Typically, the interactions involve relationships, and
they are generally mediated by public institutions, such as regulators, elected bodies, and courts
(Stevens et al., 2005).
Nonmarket strategies can play a critical role in the success of a firm. Some have found a
relationship between nonmarket success and a variety of benefits to the firm, including the creation
of first mover advantages (Frynas et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 1999). However there appears to be
a hierarchy among these stakeholders, with some achieving greater saliency than others (Bundy,
Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013; Stevens et al., 2005). I would argue that managers rank the
importance of stakeholders based upon the impact they can have on the firm’s bottom line. Thus,
even though the relationship with the nonmarket stakeholders is not explicitly an economic one,
economics still drives the basis for the relationship (Baron, 1995). In some ways, then, certain
nonmarket stakeholders might actually have a greater impact on the firm’s performance than
certain market stakeholders (Julian et al., 2008). For example, an environmental group the firm’s
managers ignore might be able to get a court order or a regulatory ruling that effectively shuts
down the operation. In this way, such a nonmarket stakeholder would actually be more important
to the firm’s success than perhaps a supplier or group of employees who could be replaced. There
might even be an interaction between market and nonmarket strategies. For example, unions might
engage in both contractual and lobbying efforts to help their cause. Thus, a player that is clearly a
market stakeholder would be engaging in nonmarket strategies.
The importance of this insight to scholars involves how to measure the impact of
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nonmarket strategies. In the past, studies have used measures other than performance to quantify
the significance of these approaches (Stevens et al., 2005). These measures, however, are often
more difficult to quantify than performance, and proxy variables to represent them can be
approximations at best. For example, some studies have looked at corporate spending on social
causes to determine the firm’s social responsibility (Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013; Marín, Rubio,
& de Maya, 2012). However, smaller firms, for example, might engage in CPA locally through
activism in civic organizations. If such a firm receives some portion of its revenues from local
government contracts or otherwise benefits from local government action, its activism would be
extremely important to its success but would not be measured by this kind of proxy variable.
The political landscape model can provide scholars with some direction as to developing
improved metrics. One study empirically assessed CPA by determining the success of utilities in
gaining approval of their rate requests (Bonardi et al., 2006). This research, however, viewed
relational and transactional approaches as alternatives. Pursuant to my argument, such a distinction
is not valuable. Instead, there should be more studies such as that where a firm’s success in
achieving its transactional goals are a direct reflection of its political capabilities. Similarly, the
political landscape model presents three factors businesses must address with the politicians. In
some cases, those factors can be directly measured, such as by looking at the media coverage of
an issue to determine if it rises to a political trend, or showing where certain legislators take
positions that might not track what one would expect given their districts. Thus, a contribution of
this article involves the development of methods to measure CPA activity.
Furthermore, applying institutional theory and agency theory to CPA has significant
implications for their literature as well. For example, agency theory posited as a threat the misuse
of corporate funds by managers contrary to the financial interests of the principals (Eisenhardt,
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1989; Matta & McGuire, 2008; Shane, 2001). In my research, I suggest that opportunism may also
result from non-financial motivations, such as where the managers might direct the firm to
advocate a policy position that does not conform to the political views of the shareholders, or even
worse, the firm's financial interests (see also Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Where
agency theory proposes taking steps to align the financial interests of the managers with those of
the shareholders, one wonders how the shareholders could better align the political agendas of
their managers with their own.
Similarly, institutional theory has been defined as a “generalized perception” that an entity
is behaving in a way deemed desirable within a “socially-constructed system of norms” (Suchman,
1995: 574). Suchman (1995) did a remarkable job defining the different kinds of legitimacy and
how firms can achieve them. Nevertheless, the target of efforts to achieve legitimacy remains a
nebulous “socially-constructed system” (see also Gomez & Jones, 2000). In this paper, I address
the opposite side of Suchman’s argument: the targets of efforts to achieve legitimacy. The system
I identify is the political system, and I identify the players on either side of such efforts, as well as
the specific mechanisms associated with each form of legitimacy. Thus, I have described the
application of legitimacy in a particular system, how such application affects the views the publics
have of the organization seeking legitimacy, and finally, how successful efforts at achieving
legitimacy can inure advantageously to the organization’s benefit. Such analysis could presumably
be applied in other systems, such as the market that brings investors and firms together, for
example. Thus, my research contributes to the literature on institutional theory by adding
specificity to the application of legitimacy efforts.
Perhaps the most significant limitation to this research is its focus on politics of the United
States. Granted, the United States remains the world’s largest economy, and its political system is
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well-established, but it must be stated that this approach might not apply in other countries. As a
result, scholars from other parts of the world might need to modify this theory to suit their own
country’s system, or they might need to develop a separate theory in and of itself. I make no claim
that this theory applies anywhere except in the United States or other similar countries.
Nevertheless, I hope it starts a process of exploring how the various political systems interact with
their business communities.
2.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed an extension of the prior political market theory that viewed
CPA as a series of market interactions. The problem with that theory is that the political market
tends to be rife with inefficiencies and opportunism. Any kind of actual contractual arrangement
in this arena is completely unenforceable and might even be illegal. While it is true that the political
market theory identified certain essential interactions in CPA, it needed an explanation as to how
these contributions actually impact the process. Considering these elements as currency in a
transaction is simply too limiting. In this way, my theory contributes to scholars’ understanding of
the CPA process.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL EXTENSION -- WHY DO BUSINESSES ENGAGE IN
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY? AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE
3.1. Introduction
Corporate political activity (CPA) is a field that has garnered much attention among
scholars over the past two decades. Despite the fact that CPA is a nonmarket activity, and as a
result, outside the typical realm of strategy research (Bonardi et al., 2006; den Hond et al., 2014;
Stevens et al., 2005), this attention is warranted. Since the regulatory era began in the 1960s, the
impact of government on business has increased dramatically (Shaffer, 1995). At this point,
regulation appears to impact just about every aspect of modern business activity (Lester et al.,
2008). Businesses have responded to government’s increasingly potent effect with activism aimed
at either reducing regulations or turning government policy to their own benefit (Hillman et al.,
2004; Shaffer, 1995). While many American executives dislike government and politics and find
CPA distasteful, they also believe that it can lead to competitive advantage (den Hond et al., 2014;
Frynas et al., 2006; Pearce et al., 2008; Schuler et al., 2002; Shaffer, 1995; Shaffer & Hillman,
2000). Frynas et al. (2006) specifically found that government relations activities can lead to first
mover advantage in developing countries (see also Kingsley et al., 2012). In the United States,
Schuler (1996) showed that CPA can impact trade policy (see also Lindeque & McGuire, 2010);
Yackee and Yackee (2006) found that businesses engaging in CPA have a greater impact on
regulators than other non-business interests; Hansen et al. (2005) found that CPA is related to
successful government contracting; and Hadani and Schuler (2013) did find a link between CPA
investments and firm performance in highly regulated industries. As a result, it appears that the
attention shown CPA by scholars is justified.
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Notwithstanding such focused treatment, there is lack of clear explanation in the literature
as to why businesses engage in CPA. For example, Hadani and Schuler (2013) could not find a
link between firm performance and CPA in most industries, while Hillman (2005) did find a
connection between firm performance and having politicians on the board. Similarly, Schuler et
al. (2002) could not establish a relationship between firm slack and CPA, although that finding has
also been disputed (Hillman et al., 2004). Furthermore, Hansen et al. (2015) did not find that
corporate spending on politics increased in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, despite expectations that the Supreme Court’s making it
easier for firms to spend treasury funds on political activity would result in a higher level of CPA
(see also Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010). Even in the political science literature, efforts to find
empirical support for Olson’s theory of firms (1965), which argues that firms engage in CPA to
gain access to public goods, have been stymied (Hansen et al., 2005). As a result, an unresolved
question exists that scholars in both management and political science have called to be researched
(Hojnacki et al., 2012; Holburn & Bergh, 2008; Néron, 2009; Pearce et al., 2008).
In this paper, I use agency theory and stewardship theory to create a more nuanced model
to explain why businesses invest in CPA. I argue that decisions to invest in CPA could be driven
by one of two motivations on the part of the firm’s top managers. On the one hand, managers
engage in CPA to influence policy that could benefit the firm. This stewardship-based approach to
understanding CPA has been the dominant view of management scholars thus far (Hadani et al.,
2015). Less researched has been another possible motivation of managers to engage in CPA: the
use of the firm’s resources at their disposal to pursue a personal political agenda that may or may
not benefit the firm. In effect, this view represents an agency approach to understanding CPA,
where the managers are engaging in opportunism, defined as “self-interest seeking with guile”
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(Williamson, 1985: 30, 47). My expectation is that the more discretion managers have over
resources, the more likely the managers are to behave opportunistically and to engage in a selfserving political program. However, where those factors are limited, the managers would instead
behave more like stewards. I also predict that the best-performing firms will be those where the
managers behave as stewards instead of behaving opportunistically. I test this theory empirically
using a unique database and find support for my predictions.
This paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, I address an issue that
has puzzled scholars regarding the motivation of managers to engage in CPA. Second, I clarify the
role of slack in promoting CPA, and demonstrate the relative importance of absorbed slack in this
activity.
3.2. Theory and Hypotheses
3.2.1. Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory
Agency theory has been described as the “metaphor” of a contract (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59).
By definition, however, agency theory is not a metaphor of a contract; it is in fact a legal contract
(Lan & Heracleous, 2010). The management theory is based on the legal concept that principals
can delegate authority to agents to act on their behalf (Dalley, 2011). From the beginning, lawyers
have been aware of the problems that can arise in such an arrangement. To attorneys, the answer
seems simple: build a stronger contract. By drafting a contract that eliminates discretion on the
part of the agents, lawyers argue that the agents will have no choice but to follow the rules (Dalley,
2011; Lan & Heracleous, 2010).
Economists recognized a problem with this purely legalistic approach. The basis for this
insight was Coase’s conception of the boundaries of the firm as based on whether contracts can be
most efficiently managed internally or externally (Scott, 2004; Williamson, 1981). Agency theory,
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like Transaction Cost Economics, suggested that managing these contracts has associated costs,
and the goal of economic entities should be to minimize those costs (Dalton, Daily, Certo, &
Roengpitya, 2003; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Williamson, 1981). Thus, to avoid the risks of
opportunism, principals would incur costs (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992;
Hagen & Choe, 1998; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Above and beyond the obvious legal costs
involved with drafting extensive contracts, economists pointed out that other problems arising
from this relationship would have their own costs (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). In
particular, moral hazard arises from the fact that agents’ own resources are not at risk. The losses
resulting from this incongruity is one cost the economists pointed to (Foss & Lindenberg, 2013).
Similarly, adverse selection is the problem that results from the fact that the principals typically
have less information than the agents. The gap between what the principals find out from the agents
themselves or from other sources and the true nature and intentions of the agents leads to
inefficiency (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2013). Thus, the economists took agency
theory another step from its legal origins, adding nuance to its understanding of the costs and risks
that arise from such a relationship.
In response to the problems pointed to by economists, management scholars looked for
possible solutions (Rumelt et al., 1991). To address the potential for shirking, scholars proposed
increased oversight; to address moral hazard, better alignment of the interests of the two parties
(Sieger, Zellweger, & Aquino, 2013). Each of these approaches, however, had its own associated
costs and disadvantages. For example, in addition to the actual costs of overseeing the behaviors
of agents, principals may experience lesser performance by the agents. Empirical studies have
validated that such shrinkage can result (Eisenhardt, 1989). Similarly, efforts to more closely align
the interests of top managers with those of shareholders have led to the granting of stock options.
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Yet, the granting of stock options has become the basis for the extreme increases in CEO pay
relative to the pay of other employees. This result might not bother the shareholders if this high
pay for top managers results in superior returns on the shareholders’ investment, but a metaanalysis conducted by Dalton et al. (2003) did not support that proposition. Thus, as a number of
scholars have already pointed out, the standard solutions proposed in response to the agency
problem are unsatisfying at best (Davis et al., 1997; Ghoshal, 2005).
To address this problem, some scholars have proposed stewardship theory as an alternative
to agency theory (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Hoskisson et al., 1999). As
recently as 2012, Hernandez (2012) pointed out that stewardship theory is still ill-defined, and that
scholars have mostly addressed it in contrast to agency theory. In general, the difference between
the two has to do with the motivation of the managers. Where agency theory argued managers are
motivated by extrinsic incentives, such as financial rewards or more intense supervision,
stewardship theory suggested that intrinsic rewards, such as the appreciation of various stakeholder
groups, could also be a motivator (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007; Davis et al.,
1997). However, this theory has been criticized for advancing a selfless view of managers’
motivation that discounted opportunism (Sieger et al., 2013).
3.2.2. An agency inquiry into CPA
Hadani and Schuler (2013) found that CPA was not related to firm performance except in
industries that are highly regulated. This conclusion raises the question that if CPA is not related
to performance, why do firms engage in it? Apparently, despite CPA appearing to be a poor use
of firm resources, firms continue to spend on it (Hadani et al., 2015; McDonnell & Werner, 2016).
The traditional way management scholars have understood CPA has been through the lens
of stewardship theory, which essentially assumes that the managers engage in CPA to advance
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policies that will benefit the firm (Hadani et al., 2015). Research has shown that government policy
can directly impact the competitiveness of businesses, and as such, businesses should push for
policies that will assist them in achieving competitive advantage (den Hond et al., 2014; Frynas et
al., 2006; Pearce et al., 2008; Schuler et al., 2002; Shaffer, 1995; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000). Indeed,
it appears that stewardship theory has been the primary basis for scholars’ investigations into
nonmarket strategies (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). Scholars have also endeavored to
develop alternate explanations for CPA. Hadani et al. (2015) argue that CPA represents
opportunism on the part of top managers seeking to advance their own personal ideological agenda.
Managers empowered to use the resources available within the firm could fund CPA that satisfies
their personal political goals, rather than building support for policy that will assist the firm’s
competitiveness. In support of this idea, Hadani (2012) found that firms with higher levels of
institutional ownership—in effect, firms where the owners have the ability to provide stricter
supervision of managers—have lower levels of CPA.
3.2.3. The role of managerial discretion
Hadani et al. (2015) found some support for the proposition that managerial discretion
would be positively related to CPA. In other words, where the firm’s managers have more ability
to impact the activities of their firms, those firms tend to undertake more CPA. Managerial
discretion refers to the latitude of options top managers have in making strategic choices (Boyd &
Salamin, 2001; Rajagopalan, 1997). If we accept agency theory’s premise, we can assume that the
greater decision-making managerial discretion would result in a certain amount of opportunism.
If, as I theorize above, one form of opportunism might be CPA aimed at advancing the top
managers’ own personal ideological agenda, then one would expect to see more of that kind of
opportunistic CPA where the managers’ hands are freed by greater discretion (Clayton & Bower,
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1996; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hadani et al., 2015; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987;
Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker, 2015). On the other hand, where there is less managerial
discretion, top managers will be limited in the tactics and strategies they can engage in (Boyd &
Salamin, 2001). In essence, the managers will be required to act on behalf of the shareholders’
interests, rather than their own. If we expect that one kind of opportunism might involve CPA
aimed at benefiting the managers’ personal political priorities rather than the practical needs of the
firm, this lack of discretion will force managers away from such opportunism and instead toward
CPA that will ultimately benefit the shareholders.
Based on the above arguments, I can predict the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Managerial discretion will have a negative effect on CPA focused on the
interests of the shareholders.
3.2.4. The role of slack
To engage in opportunistic CPA, managers must have access to resources for those CPA
efforts. CPA can be a relatively expensive undertaking (Apollonio & La Raja, 2004; Shaffer,
1995). Although the potential financial returns from successful CPA efforts can be enormous
(Shaffer, 1995), and although many firms view CPA as a cost of doing business (Kingsley et al.,
2012), it is hard to imagine that most firms, particularly those firms in industries facing less
government regulation, would view CPA as a critical expense. Thus, in firms where managers
have less access to resources, even if those managers have the inclination to engage in self-serving
CPA, they will not have the ability to do so. On the other hand, in cases where CPA is critical to
the firm’s success, such as in more-regulated industries or where the firm sells to the government,
firms will continue to expend funds on CPA even as other discretionary expenses are cut (Schuler
et al., 2002).
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Slack has been defined as “resources in excess of the requirements necessary for the
efficient operation of a firm” (Huang & Li, 2012: 382). Overall, slack can be divided into at least
two elements: financial slack, sometimes called available slack, and absorbed slack (Love &
Nohria, 2005). Financial slack is “typically used to refer to the amount of liquid resources a
company has for the discretionary uses of management” (Natividad, 2013: 847). This kind of slack,
however, would be readily visible to shareholders on the company’s financial statements, and as
liquid resources, they would be available for distribution to shareholders through dividends or for
investment in projects aimed at increasing the company’s stock value (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008).
On the other hand, absorbed slack would be harder for shareholders to see, although the managers
themselves would be well aware of it (Love & Nohria, 2005). Absorbed slack is said to exist in
the ﬁrm as “excess costs, such as unused capacity and skilled employees” (Huang & Li, 2012:
382). Absorbed slack has been shown to be accessed when firms restructure to address financial
difficulties (Love & Nohria, 2005). Thus, if managers wish to engage in a self-serving behavior,
such as pursuing personal political agendas, they could do so without raising shareholder concerns
by accessing resources buried as absorbed slack. Furthermore, given the finding that firms use
absorbed slack to reorganize during financial crises (Love & Nohria, 2005), availability of
absorbed slack indicates that a firm is not facing financial constraints that would curtail managers’
discretionary expenses. As a result, if managers wish to engage in self-serving CPA, they would
likely have to be in firms with higher absorbed slack.
The relationship between managerial discretion and absorbed slack can be characterized as
a mediation relationship. On the one hand, where managers have discretion and wish to engage in
opportunism, they can do so without alerting shareholders to the availability of these resources by
building them into the firm’s absorbed slack. This could be done by managers creating budget line
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items that they do not intend to actually fund, making it appear as if the funds are unavailable for
discretionary spending when in fact they are (Moulick & Taylor, 2017). Indeed, some have
distinguished the two forms of slack as based on whether the assets are committed to a specific
purpose or not (Moulick & Taylor, 2017; Tan & Peng, 2003; Wefald, Katz, Downey, & Rust,
2010). However, just because funds are committed to a purpose does not mean that they eventually
are spent as was supposedly intended (Anderson, Asdemir, & Tripathy, 2013). This fact helps
explain the finding in prior research that agency theory better explains absorbed slack than
financial slack (Tan & Peng, 2003). Thus, where there is greater managerial discretion, one can
expect greater absorbed slack. At firms where managers behave opportunistically by taking
advantage of their discretion and concealing assets in absorbed slack, I expect those managers to
behave similarly opportunistically with regard to their CPA. On the other hand, where managers
choose to focus their efforts on the interests of the shareholders despite their ability to behave
opportunistically due to higher levels of managerial discretion, in effect not storing resources as
absorbed slack despite their ability to do so, I expect those managers to also behave in the
shareholders’ interests when it comes to CPA. As a result, one can imagine a partial mediation
relationship as shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3 - Conceptual Model
H2: Mediation
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The above analysis leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Managerial discretion will have a negative and indirect effect via absorbed
slack on CPA focused on the interest of the shareholders such that managerial discretion will be
positively associated with absorbed slack and absorbed slack will be negatively related to CPA
focused on the interests of the shareholders.
3.2.5. Regulation
Hadani and Schuler (2013) showed that there is a positive relationship between the level
of regulation a firm faces, its level of CPA, and firm performance. This finding is logical in that
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regulated firms would be those most impacted by governmental decisions, and as a result, effective
CPA would be essential to those firms to ensure they operate within a favorable environment.
Indeed, to a much higher degree than firms in other kinds of industries, regulated firms can directly
impact their environment through the effective use of CPA (Bonardi et al., 2006). The key point
here, however, is that these firms need to successfully mold policy to achieve that goal. Changing
policy will require firms to build coalitions of politicians until they gain majority support.
Majorities are achieved by wooing undecided politicians to their point of view, not by attacking
or rewarding politicians who already have hardened positions.1 As a result, given the critical nature
of successful CPA to regulated firms, one can expect that more-regulated firms will be conscious
of the need to build majority coalitions of politicians, and thus will focus their efforts on the
undecided moderates. As a result, industry regulation will in effect reduce the ability of top
managers to behave opportunistically in their CPA.
As discussed earlier, managerial discretion allows top managers to divert resources into
absorbed slack, and thus it enables top managers to behave opportunistically. Since managerial
discretion refers to the latitude of options top managers have in making strategic choices (Boyd &

Political scientists generally argue that interest groups, including businesses, tend to advocate
their positions to politicians who were neither supportive of nor opposed to the interest group’s goal and
focus their lobbying essentially toward the uncommitted ideological moderates who enter the debate at
issue without predispositions; see Hall, R. L., & Deardorff, A. V. 2006. Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.
The American Political Science Review, 100(1): 69-84. This idea makes intuitive sense. Consider a piece
of legislation moving through the U.S. Senate. With one hundred senators, if forty-five senators favor the
business’s position, and forty-five are opposed even before the issue comes up for consideration, a not
uncommon situation due to the profound ideological commitments held by most politicians—see Iyengar,
S., & Hahn, K. S. 2009. Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use.
Journal of Communication, 59(1): 19-U16, Thomsen, D. M. 2014. Ideological Moderates Won't Run:
How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress. Journal of Politics, 76(3): 786-797.—the
firm should spend its limited resources convincing the ten who have not yet decided which way to vote. If
from those ten uncommitted legislators the business can convince six to support its position, the business
will gain majority support and achieve its legislative end. Thus, rather than expending limited resources to
talk to all one hundred senators, the business can target the ten undecided ones with fewer resources to
achieve the same goal.
1
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Salamin, 2001; Rajagopalan, 1997), and government regulation “restricts some of the strategic
options available and most of the decision-making and planning functions are shifted away from
a firm’s managers and boards to public officials” (Pugliese, Minichilli, & Zattoni, 2014: 1191), it
stands to reason that more regulation will result in less managerial discretion (see also Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1990). As a result, the exogenous force of industry regulation (Luo, 2003) will reduce
the discretion of managers to build resources as absorbed slack; thus it in effect moderates the
impact of managerial discretion on absorbed slack. This argument leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Industry regulation will negatively moderate the relationship between
managerial discretion and absorbed slack.
3.2.6. CPA and performance
Finally, political positions can result in extreme emotions (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993;
Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). Research has shown, however,
that executives may harbor certain personal political views that are different from the political
views they publicly espouse on behalf of their company (Adams & Hardwick, 1998). Agency
theory, then, points to a potential issue. The interests of the shareholders likely correlate to doing
effective CPA, since CPA can affect the firm’s success (Shaffer, 1995), and effective CPA,
pursuant to the analysis above, requires that the firm’s top managers engage with more moderate
politicians. Top executives, however, have their own views, which tend to be more conservative
than moderate (Adams & Hardwick, 1998). If the managers consider themselves as trustees for the
shareholders, as stakeholder theory suggests, they will likely work with the moderate politicians
to maximize firm performance (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Aguilera et al., 2008). On the other
hand, if they act more as agents, as agency theory predicts, there is the possibility that they will
use company resources to benefit the political causes they support rather than the ones that will
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necessarily lead to higher performance (Davis et al., 1997). Thus, there could develop a divergence
of interests between the shareholders and the managers, creating the typical agency problem
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Interestingly, agency theory generally predicts that such differences will occur
over financial issues, such as pay and equity; in this case, the force driving the rift would be the
political preferences of the executives against the financial interests of the shareholders (Nyberg,
Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). Given that the American public tends to take a negative view
of CPA (den Hond et al., 2014), the potential damage such rogue actions could have on a
company’s value are real. Consider the outrage sparked when retailers Best Buy and Target made
large political contributions to a political group opposed to gay marriage in 2010 (Mullins &
Zimmerman, 2010). Furthermore, American law makes it very hard for shareholders to monitor
and control the political activities of managers (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010), opening the door for
agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, if one assumes that opportunism on the part of top
managers ultimately hurts firm performance, as agency theory seems to imply, then it follows that
firms where top managers engage in CPA opportunistically will not perform as well as firms where
top managers focus their efforts on improving performance for shareholders.
The above analysis leads to my final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: CPA focused on the interests of the shareholders will have a positive effect
on firm performance.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
4.1. The Sample
To test the hypotheses 1-3, I constructed a unique database from a number of sources. Such
an approach is accepted in CPA research (see e.g. McDonnell & Werner, 2016). First, I sourced
financial contribution data from OpenSecrets.org (Apollonio & La Raja, 2004), selected out
contributions from the 2014 electoral cycle that were identified as being donated by firms in the
sector “Misc Business,” and sorted that data by member of Congress. I selected contributions from
this sector since it is a sector that is both a significant contributor to the campaign finance system
as well as one that represents a general pro-business approach. From their websites, I downloaded
the Congressional scorecards from the Club for Growth, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
matched the aggregate scores from these organizations as well as specific targeted votes with the
members of Congress (Groseclose, Levitt, & Snyder, 1999). Next, I identified each member of
Congress with dummy variables representing whether they were incumbents in the 2014 election.
Then, I combined this data with the general election results from the last election each member of
Congress participated in, urban population data from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the state’s probusiness rating according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce foundation (2013). Lastly, following
McKee and Teigen (2009), for each member of Congress, I added a dummy variable for the region
of the country that member represented. From this combined database, I selected my variables. All
variables were standardized except for dummy variables and the pro-business rating, since that
data is uniformly distributed. Finally, I organized this data by member of Congress, resulting in a
sample size of 525 including 98 Senators and 427 Representatives.
For hypotheses 4-7, I used the same data with some modifications. For example, I added
data on firm performance, slack, industry and size from Compustat. I then combined the data from
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the above databases, resulting in matched data of 26,205 contributions by 436 companies made to
287 congressional candidates. After I combined multiple contributions by a firm to an individual
candidate, I ended up with a database of 11,054 firm-candidate contribution combinations. Next,
I attached data regarding the level of federal government regulation experienced by each
contributing firm based on their industry from regdata.org (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, 2014).
Next, to determine the partisan performance of the recipient's district, I added to each record the
most recent version of the partisan voter index, which has been produced by the Cook Political
Report and Polidata since 1997 (Wasserman & Finn, 2017). Finally, I combined these data with
demographic data for the recipients’ districts from the U.S. Census Bureau, such as percentage of
urban and rural populations. From this combined database, I selected my variables. Since the
dependent variable for these hypotheses did not appear to display a normal distribution, I corrected
for skewness by calculating the natural log of that variable (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Julian &
Ofori-dankwa, 2013).
4.2 Variables
4.2.1. Dependent Variables
There are three dependent variables, one for each of the three hypotheses. For hypothesis
1, the dependent variable is how each member of Congress voted on the so-called “CROmnibus”
bill, the budget deal that passed late 2014 that allowed the U.S. Federal government to remain in
operation, and a vote that was targeted as important to business by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
This legislation passed just hours before a deadline that would have resulted in a shutdown of the
federal government – the result of a high-stakes dispute between Republicans and Democrats over
what government spending should be increased and which should be decreased, defense or
domestic discretionary, and whether such spending should be funded with tax increases or

64
spending cuts (Chappell, 2014). From business's perspective, shutting down the government would
have been disastrous since it would put a stop to many programs businesses rely upon, and it could
hurt the overall economy (Zetlin, 2018). This vote was a good choice for my test because it was
controversial, passing the House with a narrow margin of 219-206, both parties were split, it
occurred after the election, and it was targeted by the U.S. Chamber in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. In essence, my test would look at whether the three elements of the
political landscape would make a member of Congress more or less likely to vote for this bill. This
variable is dichotomous, with 1 indicating a vote in favor of the bill, which is the Chamber’s
favored position.
For hypothesis 2, the dependent variable is the amount of money contributed to the
member of Congress by donors identified as being part of the sector “misc business.” Amount of
political contributions is reflective of level of CPA (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000). This sector
accounted for 140,140 individual contributions and 23,996 from registered political action
committees (PACs). This sector includes industries as diverse as manufacturing, retail sales, and
lodging/tourism, to name a few – essentially all industries that do not fit into another of the larger
categories. For comparison, this sector represents the fifth largest number of PAC contributions
during this cycle, after only the ideological/single issue sector, the labor union sector, the
finance/insurance/real estate sector, and the health sector, and it ranks just above the energy sector
and the communications sector. Overall, this sector represents 14.5% of the total PAC
contributions made during the 2014 election cycle.
For hypothesis 3, I used the Club for Growth aggregate score for each member of
Congress based upon their Congressional report card (see Groseclose et al., 1999). Advocacy
organizations will frequently produce a document in which they list the various votes they consider
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important, and list how each politician voted on that issue. Each year, the Club for Growth will
publicize this list, showing how each member of Congress voted on its prioritized issues. Over
time, the Club for Growth will combine these scores into a cumulative score for the member of
Congress on how each voted on its key issues. Thus, the higher the cumulative score, the more
ideologically aligned the member of Congress is to the Club for Growth, while those with the
lowest scores will be those most opposed to the organization. In this way, advocacy organizations
can specify which politicians voted most in favor of their agenda, earning a score of 100, signifying
that the member of Congress voted in favor of the Club for Growth's position 100% of the time,
and which did not, thus earning a score of 0. These are absolute scores, not calculated relative to
how other members of Congress voted. The use of organization scorecards in CPA research is a
common approach (Groseclose et al., 1999). This organization is pro-business and pro economic
development. The group is more polarizing than the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and is viewed
as a key opponent by many environmental advocates. As a result, the legislative strategy for this
group is more focused than that of the more moderate and inclusive Chamber.
For hypotheses 4-6, to operationalize CPA, I matched each contribution in my database
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce cumulative score for the member of Congress 2 who received
it. Then, I transposed that score such that a 50% Chamber rating would equate to 100, and the
farther away the score was from 50, the lower the index number. Next, I multiplied the resulting

2

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce publishes a list of votes that its legislative unit prioritizes and which way
the Chamber wants members of Congress to vote. Each year, the Chamber will publicize this list, showing how each
member of Congress voted on its prioritized issues. Over time, the Chamber will combine these scores into a
cumulative score for the member of Congress on how each voted on its key issues. Thus, the higher the cumulative
score, the more ideologically aligned the member of Congress is to the Chamber, while those with the lowest scores
will be those most opposed to the Chamber. However, members of Congress with scores closer to 50% will
sometimes vote with the Chamber, sometimes against it, suggesting a more moderate position on these issues, being
neither fully pro-business nor pro-regulation. As a result, the most moderate members of Congress will be those with
a cumulative Chamber of Commerce voting record closer to 50%, while those with scores closer to either 100% or
zero will hold more extreme views.
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number for each recipient of the contributions by the amount received from each firm. In this way,
I account for circumstances where a firm might make very large contributions to more moderate
candidates and smaller contributions to more extreme ones, and vice versa. Finally, I divided my
dataset into two parts: one where the variable described above is above the median value, one
where it is below. The records where the CPA focus is above the median therefore constitute the
firm-candidate contribution combinations where the firms are engaging in CPA focused on the
interests of shareholders, based on my argument above that the most cost-effective CPA will be
aimed at the politicians who are undecided, located in the uncommitted, moderate middle. I log
transformed this variable to minimize potential skewness in the data (Lee, 2010; Oh, Chang, &
Kim, 2016).
Finally, for hypothesis 7, Return on Assets (ROA) is a variable commonly used in strategy
research to measure performance (Houthoofd & Heene, 1997; McNamara, Deephouse, & Luce,
2003). I calculated this variable as the ratio of net income to total assets (Jayachandran,
Kalaignanam, & Eilert, 2013).
4.2.2. Hypotheses 1-3 Independent Variables
Hypothesis 1. Due to the fact that this hypothesis sought to test the importance of all three
elements of the political landscape to a policy supplier’s position on an issue, I included three
independent variables here. First, to represent relationships, I used the amount contributed by the
sector misc business to the member of Congress. Financial contributions are considered reflective
of the relationship between the donor and the recipient politician (Brown, Drake, & Wellman,
2015; McKay, 2012). Second, to represent ideology, I included the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
cumulative rating from its 2014 Congressional scorecard (Groseclose et al., 1999). Finally, to
represent the political trends in the supplier’s constituency, I included the pro-business rating by
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the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation for the state the member of Congress represents (Poe,
2013). Other research in this field has also used pro-business ratings by policy advocacy groups
as indicative of the pro-business orientation of a body politic (Peksen, Blanton, & Blanton, 2017).
The pro-business rating is based upon policies passed by state legislatures and implemented by
governors (Poe, 2013). In states where there is strong support for pro-business policy among the
voters, these elected officials would tend to implement a more pro-business agenda, resulting in a
higher rating. Similarly, in states with more pro-regulation electorates, the elected officials will
tend to be less business-friendly. Thus, the level of pro-business orientation the state follows is
likely a good indicator of the level of pro-business orientation of the state's voters overall.
Hypothesis 2. The independent variable for this regression is the level of partisan influence
in the district of the member of Congress. For this variable, I relied upon the most recent version
of the partisan voter index, which has been produced by the Cook Political Report and Polidata
since 1997 (Wasserman & Finn, 2017). Using results averaged from the last two presidential
elections, this index indicates the level of partisanship a district displays in its voting patterns
relative to the nation as a whole. This data has been used in political science research as a measure
of partisanship in a congressional district (Jacobson, 2013). In a district or a state displaying highly
partisan behavior in its voting patterns, the primary election will have more of an impact than the
general election on the ultimate selection of the elected official (Ansolabehere, Hansen, Hirano, &
Snyder, 2007). In those districts that tend to have competitive primaries but relatively noncompetitive general elections, the institutional party will have more influence (Hassell, 2016).
Thus, districts with a higher partisan performance, and thus a higher partisan voter index, will tend
to have more powerful political parties than those with more competition in the general elections.
To test Hypothesis 3, I measure the level of effort policy demanders make to influence the
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position of specific members of Congress. Specifically, I used OpenSerets.org to obtain amount of
money spent on issue advertising in each state by the American Petroleum Institute (API) in the
period before the vote on the Keystone XL pipeline, an issue strongly supported by both the energy
industry and the Club for Growth. The API is an industry trade organization with over 625 member
companies working in the oil and gas industries (American Petroleum Institute, 2018). The API
claims to speak for the oil and gas industry, and engages in advocacy on its behalf. Since the oil
and gas industry was strongly supportive of the Keystone XL pipeline development, the API
aggressively advocated for the legislation's passage, including purchasing independent television
advertising in the media markets affecting the states of targeted Senators (Tumbull, 2016). As a
result, this single vote provides me with a specific case in which a policy demander will target its
CPA toward specific policy suppliers, allowing me to determine which policy suppliers it targeted.
I used the issue advertising aimed at 98 Senators as representative sample for this research. Since
I hypothesized a quadratic relationship here, I included both the variable and its square in the
regression.
4.2.3. Hypotheses 4-7 Independent Variables
Managerial discretion. To measure this variable, I followed Finkelstein and Boyd (1998)
as follows: Munificence (market growth) + R&D intensity (R&D expense/sales) + Advertising
intensity (Advertising expense/sales) – Capital intensity (Property, Plant and Equipment Total
(Net)/Employees) + Herfindahl index for the industry. All elements were standardized before
performing the calculation.
Absorbed slack. I followed Love and Nohria (2005) and operationalized absorbed slack
as the ratio of sales, general and administrative (SG&A) costs to sales.
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Regulation. To operationalize the level of industry regulation, I added the number of
industry-relevant restrictions for each 4-digit NAICS code for the period of 2010 to 2014 from the
regdata.org database (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, 2014). I then converted these 4-digit NAICS
industries into 4-digit SIC industries to match them to my data.
4.2.4. Hypotheses 1-3 Control Variables
Note that not all controls were included in the regressions testing all the hypotheses.
General election result. This is the percentage of the vote the member of Congress
received in the prior election. It is often argued that political demanders are more likely to support
entrenched incumbents since they are more likely to be reelected, and thus more likely to be present
when the demanders’ issues come before Congress (Perry & McWhirter, 2010). As a result, I
expect that the safer an incumbent’s position, based upon his or her margin in the last election, the
more that official will be able to raise from all groups irrespective of ideology.
Incumbent dummy variable. Political science research has established that there is value
to incumbency for elected officials (Schaffner, 2006). This advantage can take many forms,
including access to resources and the fact that incumbents face less competitive campaigns (Benoit
& Marsh, 2008; Cox & Katz, 1996). As a result, I controlled for incumbency with a dummy
variable that was 1 when the politicians were incumbents in the 2014 election, a zero when they
were not. I did not include this variable in my tests of hypothesis 3 since, by definition, the
American Petroleum Institute would have been only targeting incumbent members of the Senate
with their CPA efforts, thus meaning that this sample only included incumbents.
Urban population percentage. It has been shown that the political environment of urban
areas is quite different from that of more rural areas (DelReal & Clement, 2017; McKee & Teigen,
2009). As a result, I controlled for this factor. Calculated from census data, this variable was
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included due to the different voting patterns displayed by urban versus rural communities.
Region. Since political dynamics vary based upon geography, I included dummy variables
for four of the five regions identified by McKee and Teigen (2009). For each of the regions,
Midwest, Pacific, South and West, there is a 1 in the appropriate column, a 0 otherwise. This
control was not included in the test of hypothesis 1 or 2 due to the fact that the State pro-business
rating independent variable is based upon geography, whereas there is no such variable in the test
of hypothesis 3, resulting in its inclusion as a control variable there.
4.2.5. Hypotheses 4-8 Control Variables
Financial slack. Since slack is made up of two components, financial slack and absorbed
slack (Love & Nohria, 2005), I wanted to ensure that my arguments apply to slack overall, and not
just to absorbed slack. As a result, I controlled for financial slack to show how it responds
differently to the agency influences I theorized. Following Kim et al. (2008), I calculated this
variable as the ratio of quick assets (cash and marketable securities) to liabilities.
Firm size. I controlled for the size of each firm based on the number of employees of each
firm obtained from the Compustat database.
Level of party influence. I controlled for firms making safer contributions to easier
reelection campaigns versus those making riskier contributions in more competitive districts. This
variable is based on the presidential vote in the district of the member of Congress receiving each
contribution in the 2012 elections. I then subtracted that number from fifty, creating a variable
where the farther away the vote average is from 50%, the higher the party influence.
Urban population percentage. I controlled for the well-established geographical
differences in political views based on whether the candidate receiving the contribution represents
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a more urban or more rural district (McKee & Teigen, 2009). I calculated this variable from census
data for the district of each member of Congress receiving contributions.
Party dummy. I controlled for the intense partisan divisions in Washington by identifying
whether each member of Congress who received a contribution was a Democrat or a Republican.
I scored contributions to Democrats and to Republicans with a 1 and a 0, respectively.
Region dummy. Since political dynamics vary based on geography, I controlled for this
factor with dummy variables for four of the five regions identified by McKee and Teigen (2009).
For each of the regions, Midwest, Pacific, South and West, there is a 1 in the appropriate column,
a 0 otherwise.
Industry division dummy. Since choice of industry is known to have a significant impact
on a firm’s performance (McGahan & Porter, 1997), I controlled for this factor as well. The
problem of controlling for industry, however, arises with the fact that I needed to control each
industry with a dummy variable, and with this sample size, controlling for all industries would
have dramatically increased my degrees of freedom. As a result, I controlled by SIC code industry
division as defined by the United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (United States Department of Labor, 2016), resulting in ten dummy variables.
4.3. Empirical Strategy
With this data, I ran separate regressions for each hypothesis. For hypothesis 1, my
dependent variable was binary, thus I estimated using a logit model. I tested all other hypotheses
using standard OLS regression. Since hypothesis 5 theorizes a mediation relationship, I followed
the mediation test procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), combined with the Sobel
(1982) test and bootstrapped confidence intervals to test the indirect effect of managerial discretion
on CPA via absorbed slack. These procedures have been widely followed in the literature
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(Rodríguez & Nieto, 2016). As a further test to build robustness for hypothesis 5, I used the
structural equation modeling approach (Rodríguez & Nieto, 2016) to compare the goodness of fit
of the non-mediated model against the complete model, which includes the moderated mediation
effect, also known as the conditional indirect effect (Sieger et al., 2013).
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
5.1. Hypotheses 1-3
Tables 2 and 3 display descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in this
research. In neither table do I see any correlations in excess of 0.48, with most having correlations
substantially below that figure. As a result, it does not appear that there is an issue regarding
multicollinearity among the independent variables.
Table 2 - Means, standard deviations, and correlations for Hypothesis 1 and 2 data
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

1. Vote on CR Omnibus

0.51

0.50

2. Misc Business Contrib amt.

0.00

1.00

0.25
0.00

3. U.S. Chamber Rating

0.00

1.00

0.48
0.00

0.21
0.00

4. State pro-business rating

27.16

15.20

-0.07
0.14

-0.02
0.72

-0.31
0.00

5. Level of Party influence

0.00

1.00

-0.23
0.00

-0.17
0.00

-0.22
0.00

0.05
0.24

6. General election result

-0.54

1.61

-0.10
0.02

-0.02
0.58

-0.01
0.79

-0.10
0.02

0.25
0.00

7. Incumbent dummy

0.98

0.12

0.03
0.43

0.01
0.82

0.06
0.16

0.01
0.86

-0.02
0.66

8. Urban Pop. Percent

0.00

1.00

6

7

0.03
0.49

-0.22 -0.10 -0.42
0.12
0.06
0.00
-0.05
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.19
0.95
0.25
Note: Significance levels (p-values) in italics. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation,
respectively.
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Table 3 - - Means, standard deviations, and correlations for Hypothesis 3 data
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Club for Growth Rating

-0.01

1.01

2. A.P.I. ad buys

0.00

1.01

-0.04
0.71

3. General election result

-0.62

2.08

0.24
0.02

-0.12
0.24

4. Urban Pop. Percent

0.00

1.01

-0.15
0.14

0.01
0.94

0.08
0.45

5. Midwest region dummy

0.19

0.40

-0.02
0.82

0.04
0.68

-0.08
0.43

-0.14
0.18

6. West region dummy

0.28

0.45

0.23
0.02

-0.11
0.29

-0.11
0.29

0.00
0.96

-0.30
0.00

7. South region dummy

0.22

0.42

0.31
0.00

0.06
0.57

-0.05
0.59

-0.16
0.12

-0.26
0.01

-0.33
0.00

8. Pacific region dummy

0.08

0.28

-0.28
0.01

-0.11
0.30

0.10
0.35

0.30
0.00

-0.15
0.15

-0.18
0.07

9. North region dummy

0.22

0.42

7

8

-0.16
0.11

-0.35
0.09
0.18
0.10
-0.26 -0.33 -0.29 -0.16
0.00
0.40
0.07
0.34
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.11
Note: Significance levels (p-values) in italics. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation,
respectively.

I report in table 4 the beta coefficients for my OLS regressions of four models, in addition
to the standard errors and statistical significance. In models 1 and 2, I test my first hypothesis,
which predicts a statistically significant relationship between the policy supplier's position on an
issue and the three factors of the political landscape. Using each supplier's vote on the CR Omnibus
bill as my dependent variable, model 1 runs a logistic regression testing the controls only, while
Model 2 tests the independent variables as well. Consistent with my expectations, I found
statistically-significant relationships between the member of Congress’s vote on the Continuing
Resolution Omnibus budget bill and all three of the hypothesized elements of the political
landscape: the supplier’s relationships, as evidenced by the business contributions (β=0.703, p=0);
the supplier’s ideology, demonstrated by the aggregate rating granted the member of Congress by
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the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (β=1.083, p=0); and finally, the larger political trends impacting
the supplier’s district, as shown by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation’s rating of the
state’s business favorability (β=0.013, p=0.069). Thus, I find support for my first hypothesis.
Models 3 and 4 report the tests of my second hypothesis, which predicts that business
contributions will be negatively related to level of party influence, since those districts would be
the ones where CPA will have less impact. Model 3 regresses the control variables only on my
dependent variable, business campaign contributions to the policy supplier, while model 4 adds
the independent variables. Again, the results support my hypothesis with a significant negative
relationship between the level of business campaign contributions and the level of partisan
influence in the supplier's constituency (β=-0.173, p=0). Importantly, the R 2 I report for model 4
(0.039) is consistent with similar research (McKay, 2012). Thus, I also find support for my second
hypothesis.
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Table 4 - Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2

Misc. Business Contribs Amt.
U.S. Chamber Rating
State pro-business rating

Vote for CR
Omnibus
logistic
Model 1 Model 2
0.703***
(0.176)
1.083***
(0.128)
0.013*
(0.007)

Amount of Misc Business
Contributions
OLS
Model 3
Model 4

-0.134**
(0.057)
0.465
(0.761)
-0.472***
(0.094)
-0.464
(0.757)
525
0.045

-0.015
(0.027)
0.046
(0.356)
-0.101**
(0.044)
-0.054
(0.354)
525
0.011

Level of Party influence
General election result
Incumbent dummy
Urban Pop. Percent
Constant
Observations
R2/ Pseudo R2

-0.142**
(0.066)
0.051
(0.985)
-0.061
(0.112)
-0.372
(1.000)
525
0.223

-0.173***
(0.044)
0.011
(0.028)
0.013
(0.352)
-0.092**
(0.043)
-0.006
(0.350)
525
0.039

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Finally, in table 5 I report the results of my tests of my third hypothesis, which predicts an
inverse U-shaped relationship between a politician’s ideology and the CPA firms engage in with
that politician. In effect, I was predicting that CPA efforts would be aimed at the undecided,
uncommitted policy suppliers who I assumed would be most persuadable to the business's policy
position. In model 5, I test my dependent variable, the Club for Growth's rating of the policy
supplier, in relation to my control variables. In model 6, I add into my test the independent variable,
the ad buys by the American Petroleum Institute, and do not find a significant relationship
(β=0.009, p=0.910). Finally, in model 7, I add into my regression the square of the independent
variable to test whether a quadratic relationship exists, and, as predicted, do find such a relationship
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(β=-0.877, p=0.004; β=0.926, p=0.003). However, while a quadratic relationship clearly exists
between the targets of the issue advertising and the Club for Growth rating for the suppliers, as I
hypothesized, the nature of the curve is convex rather than concave. Thus, it appears that while an
important relationship exists between these variables, it does not support hypothesis three.
Table 5 - Tests of Hypothesis 3

Model 5
A.P.I. ad buys

Club for Growth Rating
Model 6
0.009
(0.083)

A.P.I. ad buys sq
General election result
Urban Pop Percent
West region dummy
South region dummy
Pacific region dummy
North region dummy
Constant
Observations
R2

0.175***
(0.040)
-0.020
(0.086)
0.425*
(0.241)
0.602**
(0.251)
-1.037***
(0.357)
-0.781***
(0.257)
0.106
(0.189)
98
0.405

0.176***
(0.041)
-0.021
(0.087)
0.427*
(0.244)
0.601**
(0.252)
-1.032***
(0.361)
-0.782***
(0.259)
0.105
(0.190)
98
0.405

Model 7
-0.877***
(0.296)
0.926***
(0.298)
0.185***
(0.039)
0.009
(0.084)
0.243
(0.240)
0.332
(0.256)
-1.357***
(0.360)
-1.085***
(0.266)
0.317
(0.194)
98
0.463

Note. Midwest region dummy is used as a base for region controls. Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

5.2. Hypotheses 4-7
5.2.1. Initial Results
Table 6 displays descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in this
research. Based on these results, there appears to be only one pair of independent variables
displaying any level of collinearity: absorbed slack and managerial discretion (β = 0.58, p = 0.00).
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This relationship is consistent with my theory predicting a direct relationship between absorbed
slack and managerial discretion as part of my mediation hypothesis. To test for multicollinearity,
I calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) of all variables, excluding my industry controls.
The mean VIF was 1.35, with the highest reaching 1.67, far below the conventional threshold of
10 (Oh et al., 2016). As a result, it does not appear that there is any issue regarding multicollinearity
among the independent variables.
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Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations
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Table 7 - Regression Results Hypotheses 4-7
(1)
CPA

(2)
CPA
-0.045***
(0.009)

Managerial discretion

(3)
Absorbed
Slack
0.568***
(0.013)

Absorbed slack

(4)
CPA
-0.013
(0.011)
-0.057***
(0.010)

Regulation

(5)
Absorbed
Slack
0.558***
(0.014)

(6)
Absorbed
Slack
0.585***
(0.014)

-0.029***
(0.011)

-0.056***
(0.012)
-0.071***
(0.012)

Man. discretion x regulation

(7)
ROA

Region dummy

-0.018**
(0.009)
0.043***
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.368***
(0.018)
Included

-0.015*
(0.009)
0.044***
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.369***
(0.018)
Included

0.133***
(0.012)
-0.029***
(0.011)
0.001
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.038
(0.024)
Included

-0.008
(0.009)
0.043***
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.371***
(0.018)
Included

0.131***
(0.012)
-0.031***
(0.011)
0.001
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.037
(0.024)
Included

0.131***
(0.012)
-0.027**
(0.011)
0.001
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.036
(0.024)
Included

0.035**
(0.017)
0.026**
(0.011)
0.015
(0.010)
0.001
(0.009)
0.000
(0.010)
-0.026
(0.023)
Included

Industry division dummy

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

12.399***
(0.103)
Observations
5,527
R2
0.098
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

12.424***
(0.103)
5,527
0.102

0.556***
(0.143)
5,527
0.404

12.456***
(0.103)
5,527
0.108

0.539***
(0.143)
5,527
0.405

0.478***
(0.143)
5,527
0.409

0.600**
(0.244)
5,527
0.224

CPA
Financial slack
Firm size
Level of party influence
Urban population percent
Party dummy (D=1)

Constant

In Table 7, I report the beta coefficients for OLS regressions of seven models, in addition
to standard errors and statistical significance. Model 8 is the baseline model, which includes only
the control variables. As shown in model 8, several of the controls reveal a statistically significant
relationship with the dependent variable: firm size (β = 0.043, p < 0.01), the party dummy (β =
0.368, p < 0.01), and financial slack (β = -0.018, p < 0.05). Larger firms, for example, likely have
more people monitoring the activities of the managers, thus reducing the likelihood that top
managers will be able to engage in opportunistic CPA. Thus, the result regarding firm size has a
sound theoretical basis. Similarly, given the expectation that top executives will lean toward
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Republican in their personal political views (Adams & Hardwick, 1998), it makes sense that CPA
aimed to benefit their personal agenda will tend to favor Republican candidates, while managers
who prioritize the interests of the shareholders will engage in a more balanced approach to making
political contributions. Finally, I predicted that absorbed slack will have a higher impact on the
ability for managers to behave opportunistically than financial slack, since the ready availability
of financial slack in the form of cash and short-term investments will make financial slack a target
for shareholders seeking dividends or other measures aimed at increasing short-term shareholder
value. Thus, while I expect that all slack, including financial slack, can lead to opportunism (see
also Huang & Li, 2012), the greater relative importance of absorbed slack should make financial
slack insignificant on its inclusion in the regression. Therefore, it is not surprising that models
excluding absorbed slack, including model 8, would show a significant and negative relationship
to CPA directed to benefit the shareholders. Thus, it appears the results meet expectations.
In model 9, I test the first hypothesis, which predicts a statistically significant negative
relationship between managerial discretion and whether the firms focus their CPA efforts on
benefiting the shareholders. The regression result supported the predicted negative relationship (β
= -0.045, p < 0.01, model 2) between managerial discretion and CPA aimed at benefiting
shareholders. Thus, I find support for hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5 predicted a relationship in which absorbed slack would mediate the
relationship between managerial discretion and the firm engaging in CPA aimed at advancing the
shareholders’ interests. I test this prediction by following the guidance of Baron and Kenny (1986)
(see Currim, Lim, & Kim, 2012; Ellis, Aharonson, Drori, & Shapira, 2017; Shan, Fu, & Zheng,
2017; Sieger et al., 2013). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the mediation effect occurs
when the (significant) effect that the independent variable has on the dependent variable becomes
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less with the inclusion of the mediator variable in the model under the condition that a significant
relation exists between the independent variable and the mediator variable and also between the
mediator variable and the dependent variable. The first step of the Baron and Kenny (1986) test
is to regress the independent variable on the dependent variable (Rodríguez & Nieto, 2016). In
model 9, I find a negative and significant relationship between my independent variable,
managerial discretion, and my dependent variable, CPA, focused on the interests of the
shareholders (β = -0.045, p < 0.01). The second step is to regress the independent variable on the
mediator (Rodríguez & Nieto, 2016). Following that direction, in model 10, I find significant and
positive relationships between managerial discretion and the mediator, absorbed slack (β = 0.568,
p < 0.01). The third step of the test is to regress the mediator and the independent variable on the
dependent variable (Rodríguez & Nieto, 2016). In model 11, I find significant and negative
relationships between absorbed slack, my mediator, and my dependent variable (β = -0.057, p <
0.01). Furthermore, it is worth noting that managerial discretion became nonsignificant once
absorbed slack was included in the regression. This finding fully supports the mediated
relationship (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Finally, I calculate the Sobel
mediation test (Currim et al., 2012), which resulted in a z statistic of -4.49 (p < 0.01), while the
Goodman and Aroian tests also show significance at the p < 0.01 level (Ellis et al., 2017). These
findings together confirm the mediation relationship predicted in hypothesis 5.
The above test is considered a conservative approach to testing for mediation (Currim et
al., 2012). Despite this fact, following the preferred approach in recent business research, I also
calculated a bootstrapped model (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Ellis et al., 2017; Preacher &
Hayes, 2004; Zhao et al., 2010). With 5,000 iterations, this technique returned a z statistic of -4.44
(p < 0.01) with a 95% confidence interval of (-0.039, -.015), which does not include zero, thus
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further supporting my mediation hypothesis (Liao, Wayne, Liden, & Meuser, 2017; Zhao et al.,
2010).
My sixth hypothesis predicted that industry regulation would negatively moderate the
relationship between managerial discretion and absorbed slack. Specifically, my theory suggests
that the positive effect of managerial discretion on absorbed slack would be lower for firms in the
industry where regulatory pressure is high. I test this prediction in models 12 and 13 by regressing
absorbed slack on industry regulation, managerial discretion, and an interaction variable between
the two variables. In model 12, industry regulation is negatively related to absorbed slack (β = 0.029, p < 0.01), while managerial discretion is strongly and positively related to absorbed slack
(β = 0.558, p < 0.01). These findings suggest that absorbed slack would be lower where there is
higher regulation, and that higher managerial discretion allows managers to direct resources into
absorbed slack. In model 13, I added the interaction variable between the managerial discretion
and regulation to model 12. As shown in model 13, the interaction variable is negative and
significant (β = -0.071, p < 0.01), which confirms hypothesis 6. The interaction plot in figure 4
also shows that the positive relationship between managerial discretion and absorbed slack
becomes less positive under high industry regulation. As a result, I find strong support for my sixth
hypothesis as well.
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Figure 4 - Moderation Effect of Industry Regulation

Finally, in model 14, I present the results of regression for hypothesis 7, which predicted a
positive relationship between firm performance (ROA) and CPA focused on the interests of
shareholders. As shown in model 14, I find the predicted positive relationship between ROA and
CPA (β = 0.035, p < 0.05). Hypothesis 7 is thus confirmed.
It is worth noting that since I specified my dependent variable using its natural log, the
coefficients of the independent variables represent a percentage change in the level of a firm’s
orientation toward CPA aimed at benefiting shareholders (Flammer, 2018). Furthermore, since the
independent variables are all standardized, a change of one represents a change of one standard
deviation. Thus, the regression coefficient of -0.045 for the managerial discretion variable (model
2) indicates that 1% reduction in the standard deviation of a firm’s managerial discretion would
increase CPA activity aimed to benefit the shareholders by 4.5%. Similarly, the regression
coefficient of 0.035 for the CPA variable (model 7) suggests that a 1% increase in the standard
deviation of a firm’s focus on CPA aimed to benefit the shareholders would be associated with an
increase in ROA by 3.5%. Consequently, based on my regression findings, I estimate that for the
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median firm in my sample with $35,471,000 in assets, this 1% increase in the firm’s CPA focus
would result in an estimated increase of net income of $183,399.
5.2.2. Additional and Robustness Tests
I performed additional structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis to build robustness in
my findings. For SEM analysis, I proposed two models: one model without a path between
absorbed slack and the variable representing CPA focused on the shareholders’ interests, and the
other model with that path added in. In effect, the first model is not mediated, while the second is
my complete model including the moderated mediation. Consistent with regression results in Table
7, the unmediated SEM model shows a significant and negative relationship between managerial
discretion and CPA (β = -0.037, p < 0.01). Once the mediation path is added in, however, the
relationship between managerial slack and CPA becomes nonsignificant (β = 0.009, p = 0.562),
and the relationship between absorbed slack and CPA aimed at benefiting the shareholders
becomes negative and significant (β = -0.079, p < 0.01), supporting the prior results which
suggested a fully mediated model. The best model fit (RMSEA 0.043, CFI 0.961) occurred when
I included the link between absorbed slack and CPA focused on the shareholders’ interests.
Furthermore, the χ2 difference between the two models is significant (Δχ2 = 24.88, 1 degree of
freedom, p < 0.01) (Ramarajan, Rothbard, & Wilk, 2017), and the Akaike information criterion
(AIC), for which lower values reflect the better-fitting model (Kunze, de Jong, & Bruch, 2016),
also supports this conclusion (AIC = 132,139.8 for the nonmediated model; AIC = 132,116.9 for
the complete model), providing further support for a mediated model as predicted in hypothesis 5.
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Figure 5 - SEM Results

Absorbed Slack

7***
-0.07

Industry
Regulation

-0
.11

2*
**

0.608***

-0.037*** (0.009)

Managerial
Discretion

0.1
61
**
*(
0.1
57
**

n/a
(-0.079***)

*)

CPA focused on
shareholders

0.074***

Performance

Standardized path coefficients for SEM model without path from absorbed slack to CPA
Parentheses: Standardized path coefficients for mediated SEM model with path added in from
absorbed slack to CPA (if different)
p > Χ2

0.00 (0.00)

RMSEA

0.05 (0.04)

CFI

0.95 (0.96)

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
RMSEA: root mean square error of approximation, CFI: comparative fit index
Note: path from CPA to performance is a correlation, since the variables impact each other.
Controls included: employees, party influence, urban population percent, party dummy.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
6.1. Hypotheses 1-3
In this research, I proposed and tested three hypotheses aimed at better explaining how
firms engage in CPA. My first hypothesis tested a model in which the CPA efforts of policy
demanders will be associated with the policy suppliers’ (a) ideology (b) political trends in their
constituency that might make an issue salient and (c) their personal relationships. I find support
for this model, suggesting that there are these institutional constraints that both limit the
effectiveness of CPA while also suggesting where firms should aim their CPA efforts. Second, I
hypothesize that political parties will be a force capable of moderating the impact of CPA. In
essence, where political parties are strong, they will be able to brunt the impact of efforts by policy
demanders to pressure the policy suppliers to adopt a specific position. Thus, the presence of strong
political parties weakens the strength of CPA. I find strong support for this hypothesis as well,
again potentially guiding practitioners in targeting their CPA, while also helping scholars
understand the relative success or failure of specific CPA campaigns. Finally, I predict that firms
will prioritize CPA aimed at policy suppliers located in the middle of the ideological spectrum,
assuming that these individuals will be undecided on the policy demanders' requests, and thus will
be most persuadable. The result of this test, however, is surprising, indicating that while there is a
quadratic relationship as I hypothesized, the policy demanders actually target their CPA toward
policy demanders whose ideology places them at one extreme or another, rather than those located
in the middle. This result in particular raises concerns that I will discuss further in my implications
section.
6.1.1. Implications
Reviewing the results of the research, there are a number of conclusions one can draw.
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First of all, there is strong support for two of my three hypotheses. Indeed, the weakest support for
my predictions appears to be the relatively weak relationship between the third factor of my
political landscape, the constituency's political trends as represented by the state's pro-business
rating, and the vote on the CR Omnibus bill (β=0.013, p=0.069). This relatively weak result might
have two explanations. First, while the level of the policy supplier’s pro-business ideology and
pro-business connections might play a large role in each of those two elements of the landscape,
the state’s pro-business orientation in the supplier’s constituency is probably a small factor of that
element. For example, there might be influence based upon the advocacy of the President, the
state’s governor, and other political leaders. The regional news media might have impacted the
views of the regional electorate, and the high level of partisanship in modern American political
culture might also have impacted the political trends of the supplier’s district. Thus, the variable I
used to test this element of the landscape makes up a far smaller portion of that element than the
variables I used to test the other two. Secondly, this variable is statewide, while the bulk of my
sample is divided into districts. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation’s rankings are by
state, and 428 of the 536 members of Congress included in my sample are members of the House
of Representatives, often representing small parts of larger states. Thus, the U.S. Chamber
Foundation ranks New York as the worst state in the nation for business. Overall, the state’s
population might share a view that is more friendly to regulation than most other states. However,
the constituents in districts in upper New York state, mostly represented by Republican members
of the House, likely have very different views from those representing New York City. As a result,
a more precise measurement of the political trends in each congressional district might find
stronger support.
One surprise in the data is the apparent relative unimportance of incumbency to CPA
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efforts. It has long been assumed that incumbency is a strong predictor of campaign contributions
and other political advantages (Benoit & Marsh, 2008; Cox & Katz, 1996; Perry & McWhirter,
2010). Such a relationship, however, was not evident in my results. For example, I did not find a
significant relationship between incumbency and the policy supplier's issue position (models 1 and
2) or the amount of contributions the candidate received from the business community (models 3
and 4). This result could simply represent a statistical anomaly due to the fact that there are so few
non-incumbents who get elected to Congress in any given year. In fact, in my data, only 9 of 525
members of Congress elected in 2014 were not incumbents. That said, controlling for the effect of
incumbency was critical given the importance so many have placed upon it in the political process.
Thus, while my results raise a question on this point, it is likely a question that will require further
research.
Finally, the unexpected result regarding hypothesis 3 seems to say much about the current
American political climate that businesses must negotiate. Rather than focusing their efforts on the
persuadable middle group of policy suppliers, demanders are focusing their efforts on the
extremes. Thus it appears that policy demanders are attempting to reward their political friends
and punish their enemies rather than establishing the long-term relationships with policy suppliers
that will produce the greatest return for the firm. This result could be a function of the deep
divisions in my current political culture, and the reduced influence of moderate politicians. In
effect, it appears that business leaders are making common cause with the activists on the political
extremes to push a specific political agenda rather than building a broad coalition in support of the
business's interests. Why business leaders have taken this approach and whether it bears fruit for
the firms might be a subject for future research, however this result might help explain the weak
link prior research has found between CPA efforts and firm performance (see e.g. Hadani &
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Schuler, 2013).
6.2. Hypotheses 4-7
6.2.1. Review of Results
Hypotheses proposed in this paper theorizing an agency view of firms’ approach to CPA
found support. The fourth hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between the dependent
variable—firms’ CPA focused on the interests of the shareholders and managerial discretion. The
predicted relationship was confirmed, which supports the theory that where managers have the
potential to behave opportunistically with the greater decision-making power, they will do so by
taking advantage of the firm’s resources to pursue a personal political agenda rather than one aimed
at advancing the firm’s policy agenda. Firms engaging in CPA aimed primarily at promoting the
firm’s interests will direct their efforts at building a majority coalition to support the policy
priorities of the firm. To do so, the firm’s managers will have to add to the base of support they
already enjoy among policymakers with undecided legislators from the ideological middle until
they have achieved their majority. In effect, these managers will be forced to behave as stewards
of the firm rather than as agents due to the lack of opportunism. On the other hand, where top
managers can behave opportunistically, they would prioritize rewarding their political friends and
punish their ideological opponents rather than building a broad coalition of supporters among
policymakers for the firm’s priorities. Thus, I find that where managerial discretion exists that
would enable top managers to behave opportunistically, they will use the firm’s assets to pursue
their own personal political priorities rather than those that benefit the firm.
In hypothesis 5, I predicted a relationship in which absorbed slack would mediate the
relationship between managerial discretion and CPA aimed at benefiting the shareholders such
that where there is higher absorbed slack, managers would be more likely to use corporate funds
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to pursue their own personal political agenda. One interesting point to come from this analysis is
the lack of a link between financial slack and CPA when the absorbed slack is accounted for. This
result might help explain why prior research has been unable to find a link between slack and CPA
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Schuler et al., 2002). In effect, the two forms of
slack needed to be split to demonstrate the relationship. Following my theory, it appears that
managers will be restricted from pursuing CPA aimed at their own personal political agenda when
slack is fully visible on the firm’s financial reports, as is the case with financial slack, unlike with
absorbed slack. Thus, my results support hypothesis 5 as well.
In hypothesis 6, I predicted that industry regulation would moderate the relationship
between managerial discretion and absorbed slack such that where managerial discretion is high,
higher regulation would restrict the managers from moving resources into absorbed slack. Higher
industry regulation has been linked to lower managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1990). This finding is the basis for my argument, and it is relevant to the overall question regarding
CPA, since I found that lower absorbed slack is linked to CPA more focused on the interests of
shareholders. Thus, in effect, higher regulation will push managers to engage in CPA benefiting
the firm by restricting the strategic options (Pugliese, Minichilli, & Zattoni, 2014: 1191) and
thereby reducing the discretion of managers to build resources as absorbed slack. Furthermore, it
is worth noting that firms operating in more-regulated environments likely have an additional
motivation to engage in moderate ideology-oriented CPA: these firms must build support for their
firm and avoid making enemies among policymakers, since these individuals could have a direct
and measurable impact on the firms’ success. If these firms pursue a strategy of punishing political
enemies, this strategy will not only fail to add new friends to the firms’ political coalition, it will
actually harden the animus of the firms’ opponents. Thus, there will be pressure from multiple
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directions pushing firms in highly regulated industries to target their CPA at the moderate middle
politicians rather than the ideological extremes, and my data support this conclusion.
Finally, I also find support for my seventh hypothesis, which predicted that the bestperforming firms will engage in CPA aimed at furthering the interests of the shareholders rather
than pursuing the managers’ personal political agenda. This result makes sense in that effective
CPA can positively impact firm performance, as I have shown above. However, if I accept the
inference of agency theory that opportunism on the part of top managers will negatively impact
the interests of the shareholders, then CPA engaged in opportunistic pursuit of top managers’
personal interests will be a characteristic of poorer-performing firms. Either way, this final
hypothesis also receives support.
My research contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I provide an answer to a
question that has vexed scholars: explaining why firms engage in CPA in the first place. For some
time, scholars have struggled with this question, particularly in light of findings that there was no
relationship between CPA and firm performance (Hadani, Bonardi, & Dahan, 2017; Hadani &
Schuler, 2013). In effect, I have alluded that CPA needs to be divided into two groups, each with
its own motivation. On the one hand are firms where the managers do not behave opportunistically
and direct their CPA toward moderate policymakers to build support for their firms’ priorities. On
the other hand are firms where top managers do behave opportunistically and use the firms’
resources in support of their own personal political agenda. The support my hypotheses receive
demonstrates the feasibility of my explanation. Second, prior research into CPA has been
dominated by a stewardship perspective, in which scholars assume managers engage in these
efforts primarily for the benefit of their firms (Hadani et al., 2015). This approach has been justified
by a view of agency theory that opportunism results primarily from economic motives (Bosse &
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Phillips, 2016). In effect, in the past, managers were viewed as purely motivated by economic
incentives, such as stock options, or fear of consequences resulting from greater monitoring of
their activity (Eisenhardt, 1989). Empirical research aimed at supporting this view of managers,
such as tests of the effectiveness of stock options, has not been favorable (Dalton et al., 2003). In
response, recent research has attempted to add nuance to agency theory, by suggesting that the
motives of managers are actually more complex, and that these complexities need to be considered
by principals as they attempt to address potential opportunism (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Thus, my
research follows this “behavioral” approach to agency theory, since I argue that opportunism can
result from ideological motives as well as financial ones. While this insight is not unique to this
study, prior research attempting to validate this idea has been largely inconclusive (Hadani et al.,
2015). Finally, the link between slack and nonmarket strategies such as CPA and corporate social
responsibility (CSR) has been widely theorized, but empirical results have been mixed, with some
studies supporting the link, others failing to find one (Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler et al., 2002;
Tan & Peng, 2003; Xu, Yang, Quan, & Lu, 2015). By specifically testing the two forms of slack,
I offer an additional test of the relationship in the context of CPA.
6.2.2. Limitations of This Research
One of the limitations of this research is that it is very U.S.-oriented. I make no claim that
this theory is directly transferable to other countries. Even so, researching American CPA is critical
given the importance of the U.S. economy and political structure on the rest of the world.
Furthermore, I believe it is likely that even where this theory cannot be applied in its entirety, an
approach that considers behavior based in power dynamics such as this one has better explanatory
power than a purely market-based one. In this way, this theory might serve as a model for similar
research in other countries.
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A further limitation is that the data only include publicly traded corporations that engage
in CPA, while not considering privately held firms. Indeed, especially given the importance family
firms play in stewardship theory research (Chrisman et al., 2007), it might be interesting to see if
family firms engage differently in CPA. Prior research has found that family firms tend to be driven
by the owners’ ideological views (Hart, 2004). On the other hand, research has also found that
family firms tend to respond strongly to the demands of outside investors, who may have different
ideological perspectives than the family owners (Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013). Thus, it
remains an open question as to whether family firms will be a vehicle for the family to engage in
ideologically driven CPA or will focus on CPA that benefits the firm.
6.3. Conclusion
Research into CPA can be a particularly exciting area due to its importance to scholarship
as well as in practice. This research can impact research into non-market strategies overall, as well
as agency theory and institutional theory. Furthermore, basic research such as this can provide
evidence both sides can use as they debate the political impact of business in the wake of the
Citizens’ United Supreme Court case. As a result, it is my hope that this paper will be useful to
many different groups in many different contexts.
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Despite the fact that Corporate Political Activity (CPA) is an area of research generating
increasing interest among both academics and practitioners, there has been relatively little
empirical research in the field, and what research has been done has often been inconclusive. In
this dissertation, I argue that prior research has been hampered by a theory that relies upon a market
analysis to understand this non-market activity. Instead, I describe and test a model of CPA in
which business interests negotiate three factors in their efforts to convince politicians to support
their positions: the ideology of the politician, the politician's relationships, and the political trends
in the politician's constituency. I also argue that two institutions moderate CPA: strong political
parties and the politicians' ideology. Relying upon agency theory, I argue that where top managers
have the ability to behave opportunistically, they will be more likely to engage in CPA that targets
politicians with more extreme ideologies rather than the undecided moderates. Such CPA might
be personally satisfying to the managers, but it is unlikely to benefit the firm. I test these theories
on a unique dataset and find support for them. This result brings more sophistication to
understanding the mechanisms of CPA, while also helping to explain a problem that had previously
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puzzled scholars, namely why businesses engage in CPA when research has failed to find a link
between CPA and firm performance in most industries.
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